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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction.
Petitioners have failed to file a timely petition for judicial
review as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Does the court have jurisdiction where Petitioner fails

to file a timely Petition for Review of Agency Action.
The standard of review for this questions is correction of
error.

See Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664

(Utah 1991) .
II.

Did the Utah State Tax Commission reasonably conclude

that sales of sand and gravel from Harper Excavating, Inc. to
Harper Contracting, Inc., were taxable transactions.
The standard of review for this issue is the "abuse of
discretion" standard pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(h)(i).
Therefore, the reviewing court should affirm the agency's
decision unless it is unreasonable.

See Morton Int'l Inc. v.

Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1991).l
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative provisions are set forth verbatim in the
attached appendix.

. The Utah Administrative Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. §
63-46-1 to -22 (1987), applies to this appeal inasmuch as all
adjudicative proceedings below were commenced after January 1,
1988. Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah
1991).

STATUTES - Appendix Is
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(8) (1987).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1987).

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1)(a) (1987).

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1989 & Supp. 1992).

8.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On appeal, Harper Investments, Inc., Harper Sand and Gravel,
Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper Contracting, Inc.
(hereinafter "Petitioners") challenge the Utah State Tax
Commission's finding that Petitioners were required to collect
and remit sales taxes with respect to inter-subsidiary sand and
gravel sales.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
An audit conducted during 1988 determined that Petitioners
were liable for sales and use taxes in the amount of $582,273.93
from sales of sand and gravel.

(R. 213, 685-693).

Statutory

notices of the deficiencies were sent September 28, 1990.
213, 685-693).

(R.

Petitioners filed a combined Petition for

Redetermination on October 26, 1990.

(R. 11-39).

On July 30, 1991, the parties presented evidence before the
Utah State Tax Commission.

(Transcript).
2

On January 9, 1992,

the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Final Decision affirming the Auditing Division's
assessment of sales tax, interest, and penalties.

(R. 207-213).

Petitioners did not file a request for reconsideration of
the Tax Commission's Final Decision within 20 days from the
issuance of the January 9, 1992, Final Decision as required by
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(1)(a).

(Respondent's Memorandum in

Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 2). Furthermore, Petitioners
did not file a petition for review of final agency action within
30 days of the Tax Commission's Final Decision as required by
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a).

(Respondent's Memorandum in

Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 2).
On February 24, 1992, Petitioners filed a motion with the
Tax Commission, relying on Utah R. App. P. 4(e), requesting the
Tax Commission to extend the time allowed for filing an appeal
from the Final Decision.

(Respondent's Memorandum in Support of

its Motion to Dismiss, 2). On March 13, 1992, Petitioners filed
an amended motion seeking permission to file a tardy petition for
reconsideration.

(R. 40). On April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission

granted Petitioners permission to file a tardy petition for
reconsideration.

(R. 30).

On May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed their Petition for
Reconsideration of the Tax Commission's Final Decision dated
January 9, 1992.

(R. 11). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

13(3)(b) a request for reconsideration is considered denied if
3

the agency does not issue an order within 20 days of the filing
of the request*

Time for filing an appeal of final agency action

is from the time the order "is considered to have been issued
under subsection 63-46b-13(3) (b). •• Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b14(3)(b).

On June 3, 1992, the Tax Commission issued an order

confirming that the petition for reconsideration was denied•
8-9).

(R.

On July 1, 1992, 147 days after the Commission's Final

Order, and 38 days after Petitioners tardy motion for
reconsideration was deemed denied, Petitioners filed a Petition
for Review of Agency Action with the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah.

(R. 2).

On January 20, 1993, Respondent filed a Motion To Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction for failure to file a timely appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a).

On April 20, 1993,

the Court denied the motion, reserving ruling on the issues
presented until plenary presentation pursuant to Rule 10(f) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Prior to 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. operated a sand

and gravel company that excavated, processed, hauled, and laid
sand, gravel, and other materials.
2.

(R. at 208).

In May of 1986, in an attempt to limit legal

liabilities, Rulon Harper, president of the parent and eventual
subsidiary corporations, decided to reorganize the corporation by
dividing and transferring the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc.
4

into three new, wholly owned subsidiaries, namely: Harper Sand
and Gravel, Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper
Contracting, Inc., (R. at 208, 567).
3.

The former Harper Excavating, Inc. changed its name to

Harper Investments, Inc., and became the parent corporation of
the three new and separate subsidiaries as a part of the
reorganization.
4.

(R. at 208, 567).

At the close of business May 9, 1986, the listed assets

and liabilities of Harper Excavating, Inc. were divided and
allocated among the three new and separate entities by the
controller of the former Harper Excavating, Inc., Steven Goddard.
(R. at 208, 567; T. 66, Respondent's Exhibit 16 p. 6).
5.

The gravel sales contracts between Rulon Harper and

Harper Excavating, Inc. were not listed as an asset of Harper
Excavating at the time reorganization occurred.

(T. 49, 80 &

85).
6.

Consequently, the rights created under those arguments

were not assigned to any of the newly formed corporations.
85).
7.

A computerized accounting system was installed to

facilitate the accounting procedures of each of the new
subsidiaries, given the fact that each corporation performed
separate business functions.

(R. at 240, 568). This system

accounted for expenses and revenue by job, by gravel pit, by
labor, and by equipment.

(R. 645).
5

(T.

8.

The financial statements do not refer to the gravel

sales agreements, nor do they list them as an asset of any of the
corporations.

(Respondent's Exhibits 15-27, T. 85, 124, 125 &

127).
9.

Following the reorganization, Harper Sand and Gravel,

Inc. purchased sand and gravel from land owned by Rulon Harper.
(T. 85, 86 & 127, Respondent's Exhibits 17 p.7, 21 p.9).
10.

Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. paid Rulon Harper

royalties for extracting gravel from pits owned by Rulon Harper
(Respondent's Exhibits 2, 3, 21 p. 9, T. 28, 39, 86, 137 & 141).
11.

Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. continues to sell sand and

gravel purchased from Rulon Harper to outside vendors.

(T. 102 &

127).
12.

During the audit period, Harper Excavating, Inc. would

purchase sand and gravel from Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.

(R.

209, T. 61, Respondent's Exhibits 18 p. 9, 22 p. 9, 26 p. 10).
13.

Harper Excavating, Inc. would sell the sand to and haul

it for Harper Contracting, Inc. (R. 209, T. 61, Respondent's
Exhibits 18 p. 9, 19 p. 9, 22 p. 6, 23 p. 7 & 9, 25 p. 8, 10, 27
p. 8-11).
14.

The sale from Harper Excavating, Inc. to Harper

Contracting, Inc. was a taxable transaction.
15.

(R. 211, T. 138).

Steven Goddard presented numerous invoices, statements,

and checks that reflected inter-subsidiary transactions of sand
and gravel between Harper Excavating, Inc. and Harper
6

Contracting, Inc. to Rulon Harper for his signature during the
audit period.
16.

(T. at 22, 60).

Rulon Harper signed the checks that paid for the sand

and gravel and its transportation costs for each sand and gravel
transaction as described in the purchase scenario above.

(R. at

248, 249; T. at 22, 61).
17.

The independent auditing firm of Sorensen, Main and

Nielsen, which conducted yearly audits of the Harper
corporations, noted the transactions in the financial statements
prepared for each corporation.
18.

(Respondent's Exhibits 15-28).

No sales taxes were collected or paid on any of the

sand and gravel sales and hauling charges among the different
corporations.
19.

(R. at 209).

In the latter part of 1988, the Auditing Division of

the Utah State Tax Commission conducted an audit of the
Petitioners for the period ranging from October 1, 1985 through
September 30, 1988.
20.

(R. at 209, 210).

The audits uncovered a deficiency of $582,273.93,

excluding interest and penalties, in sales and use taxes
primarily relating to sand and gravel sales between Harper
Excavating, Inc. and Harper Contracting, Inc. during the period
in question.
21.

(R. at 238).

In September of 1990, the Utah State Tax Commission

issued statutory notices to Petitioners, which reflected the

7

sales taxes owing on the inter-subsidiary sand and gravel
transactions.
22.

(R. 684-696).

On July 30, 1991, both parties presented evidence and

testimony regarding the sales tax assessment at a hearing before
the Tax Commission.
23.

(T. 1-152).

On January 9, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision, which
affirmed the tax assessment, interest and penalties against the
Harper corporations.

(R. 207-214).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Petitioners' failure to file a timely appeal deprives this
Court of jurisdiction.

The Tax Commission issued its Final

Decision on January 9, 1992.

Petitioners did not petition for

reconsideration of final agency decision by filing with the Tax
Commission within twenty days of the Final Decision or file for
judicial review within 30 days.
The Tax Commission's hearing of a tardy petition for
reconsideration had no effect on the finality of the January 9,
1992 Final Decision.

To conclude otherwise would grant the Tax

Commission power to extend the time for seeking judicial review
contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9).

Therefore, Petitioners

appeal is untimely and should be dismissed.
Sales between a parent and a subsidiary corporation, or
between two subsidiaries, are subject to sales tax.
entity, has a separate legal existence.
8

Each

As such, the Tax

Commission reasonably determined that the transactions between
Harper Excavating, Inc. and Harper Contracting, Inc. were
taxable.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONERS FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY APPEAL.

Pursuant to the provisions in the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, a party <an obtain judicial review of a final
agency action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 64-46b-14; and, agency
reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 64-46b-13.
In order to obtain judicial review of a final agency action
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, a party must file a
petition for judicial review within 30 days from the date the
decision was issued or is considered to be issued.
Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989).

See Utah Code

This Court has ruled that an

order is "issued" when it has been signed by f he Commission.

See

Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah
1992).

In the case at bar, the Tax Commission issued its Final

Decision on January 9, 1992.
for review within 30 days.

Petitioners did not file a request

Pursuant to the express language of §

63-46b-14(3)(a) and Utah R. App. P. 14(a), a petition for review
must be filed within 30 days of the Tax Commission's Final
Decision.

Therefore, because Petitioners failed to timely file,

9

this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioners' appeal and it
should be dismissed.2
The Tax Commission's granting of Petitioners' untimely
M

Motion to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal3" does not

extend the time allowed for judicial review of the January 9,
1992 Final Decision.

Section 63-46b-l(9) specifically states

that an agency does not have the authority to extend the time
requirements allowed for judicial review.
63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992).

See Utah Code Ann. §

This Court recently held that

the Tax Commission cannot expand the time period established for

2

. Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional in
nature and can be raised at any time during the appellate
proceedings. See Leonczynski v. Indus. Comm'n., 713 P.2d 706
(Utah 1985) .
3

A brief synopsis of the procedural history of relevant
parts this case may be helpful.
January 9, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its Final
Decision. (R. 207).
February 24, 1992, Petitioners filed a Motion to Extend Time
For Filing Notice of Appeal. (R. 165).
March 13, 1992, Petitioners filed an Amended Motion For
Relief to Challenge the Final Decision of the Tax
Commission. (R. 40).
April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission granted Petitioners'
Motion for Extend Time for Filing of Appeal. (R. 30).
May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed a Petition for
Reconsideration of the Tax Commission's January 9,
1992, Final Decision. (R. 11).
June 3, 1992, the Tax Commission denied Petitioners'
Petition for Reconsideration.
July 1, 1992, Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of
Agency Action regarding the June 3, 1992 denial of
Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration and also of the January
9, 1992, Final Order. (R. 2).
10

judicial review.

See Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah

Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1992).

Petitionees failed to file- a petition

for judicial review of the January 9, 1992, Final Decision within
the 30 day time limit.

The subsequent denial of Petitioners'

tardy Request for Reconsideration does not have the effect of
reviving Petitioners' rights to obtain judicial review as to the
January 9, 1992 Final Decision.
The Utah Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
Hase v. Hase, 775 P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Hase involved

an appeal from a district court decision, but its reasoning is
applicable to the facts of the case at bar.

In Hase the court

issued a final divorce decree on December 31, 1987, which
disposed of all the Petitioner's claims.

On January 15, 1989,

the Petitioner filed a tardy "Objection to Order" pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b).

On February 5, 1988, the district court

issued a "consolidated findings of fact, conclusions of law,
decree of divorce and order."

Petitioner then filed an appeal on

March 4, 1988.
The Petitioner in Hase argued that its appeal was timely
since it was filed within 30 days of the district court's
February 5, 1988 decision.

The Utah Court of Appeals rejected

this argument by stating:
The Consolidated Decree of Divorce and Orders
merely reiterated what the court had
previously ordered in several different
orders, referred to those orders specifically
by date in most instances, and joined them in
11

one document, as appellants requested. We
find that such an order cannot be used to
extend the time for appeal because it does
not resolve any issues extant, but merely
refers to prior orders of the court. Thus
the Consolidated Decree of Divorce and Orders
does not constitute an appealable final
order.
Id. at 945.

(Emphasis added).

The Petitioner in Hase also argued that its tardy "Objection
to Order" should stay the 30 day filing requirement for an
appeal.

The court of appeals rejected this argument as well

stating that because the objection was not filed within 10 days
as required, the objection did not qualify as a post-judgment
order, which would have suspended the time for appealing the
December 31, 1987 final order.

Id.; see also Burgers v. Maiben,

652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) (a tardy request for a new trial cannot
stay the time limits imposed upon appeals); Vanionora v. Draper,
30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 1320 (1974) (failure to file motion for
a new trial does not stay the time constraints governing
appeals).
Both the relevant statutes and the cited case law support
the proposition that the agency has no authority to extend the
time for judicial review.

In the case at bar, Petitioners failed

to petition for judicial review within the 30 day time limit.
Therefore, the Tax Commission's subsequent denial of Petitioners'

12

untimely request cannot resurrect Petitioners' right to appeal
the January 9, 1992 Final Decision/
Even if the Tax Commission could extend the time period for
filing a request for reconsideration and thus extend the time for
judicial review, Petitioners' appeal is still untimely pursuant
to section 63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Code.

Under § 63-46b-

13(3)(b) an order denying a request for reconsideration is deemed
to be issued 20 days after the filing of the request if the
agency has taken no action.
In the case at bar, although the Tax Commission eventually
issued a decision confirming the denial on June 3, 1992, the Tax
Commission failed to t IRP rut) action on Petitioners' request
within the 20 day time period.

Consequently, according to § 63-

46b-13(3)(b) Petitioners' request is deemed denied as of May 25,
1992, 20 days after filing.

In order to preserve their rights to

judicial review, Petitioners would have had to file petition for
review within 30 days of May 25, 1992, ie. June 24, 1992. The
record indicates that Petitioners filed their petition for
judicial review on July 1, 1992, which is clearly beyond the 30
day time limit set out in § 63-46b-14(3)(a)•

A

(R. 2).

. Federal Courts have long recognized that tardy motions
for reconsideration cannot toll the statute of limitations
governing appeals even if the trial court hears the motion for
reconsideration. See Denlev v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733
F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir.
1988); Martinez v. Trainer, 556 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977).
13

This Court has strictly enforced the time requirements for
the filing of an appeal.

In Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849

(Utah 1983), this Court refused to extend the 30 day time limit
for filing an appeal that was filed 2 days beyond the time limit.
Likewise, in Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep.
7 (Utah 1992), this Court also held that the 30 day time limit
runs from the date of issuance of the final decision, not the
date of notice to the parties.
The Tax Commission issued its Final Decision on January 9,
1992.

Petitioner did not file a petition for judicial review

within 30 days as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14. The
Commission does not have discretion to extend the time for
judicial review.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9).

Even if the

denial of Petitioners' untimely motion for reconsideration is a
final appealable order, separate and apart from the January 9
order, Petitioners failed to timely file from the date the motion
was deemed denied under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(a).
This Court should therefore find that it lacks jurisdiction
and dismiss Petitioners' appeal as untimely.
II.

INTERCOMPANY SALES OF SAND AND GRAVEL ARE TAXABLE
TRANSACTIONS.

"There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid
or charged for . . • retail sales of tangible personal property
made within the state."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987).

retail is a sale to a "user or consumer."
14

A

Utah Code Ann. § 59-

12-102(8)(a).

Harper Excavating, Inc. sold, hauled, and

delivered sand and gravel to Harper Contracting, Inc.

(R. 209,

Respondent's Exhibits 18 p. 8., 19 p <>, 2 2 p. 6, 23 pp. 7 & 9, 26
pp. 8 h 111, 27 pp. 8 k 11 )

Harper Contracting, Inc. issued

checks to Harper Excavating, Inc. paying for the sand and gravel
used in performing its contracts.

(T. 131-136).

Sales of sand

and gravel from one entity to a separate, albeit a related
entity, are taxable.

Hales Sand and Gravel v. State Tax Comm'n,

200 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1992).

This is true despite the claims

that the two corporations are "the same entity for tax purposes."
Id. at 7.
Once an entity elects to operate as a corporation, that
entity must accept all responsibilities that attend to the
corporate form.

Institutional Laundry, Inc. v. Utah State Tax

Comm'n, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985); see also Qgden Union Railway
and Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57
(1964), modified on rehearing, 16 Utah 2d 255, 399 P.2d 145
(1965); Cal-Metal Corp. v. California State Board of Ed., 161
Cal. App. 3d 759, 207 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1984).

In Institutional

Laundry a subsidiary company, Institutional, claimed that the
laundry service transactions between itself and its parent were
not taxable because as a subsidiary, it had no separate legal
existence.

However, this Court held that a corporation, be it a

parent or subsidiary, has its own legal status and existence, and
that transactions between a parent corporation and its
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subsidiaries are taxable.

Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d at

1067.
In response to Institutional's argument that as a subsidiary
it had no separate corporate existence, this Court stated:
A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary,
has its own identity and existence. Common
ownership or control does not automatically
destroy that separate identity. Although in
appropriate cases equity may look through the
corporate shell to its alter-ego to prevent
fraud or wrongdoing, the general rule still
applies that corporations are separate legal
entities bound by obligations as well as the
benefits . . . .
Having elected to operate as a corporation,
for whatever benefits that separate status
conferred upon Institutional and its parent,
Institutional must also accept the tax burden
and responsibility attendant to its corporate
form. A corporation may not disregard or
shed its corporate clothing to avoid tax
consequences.
Id. at 1067.
Here, the Tax Commission found that the former Harper
Excavating, Inc. attempted to limit its legal liability by
dividing itself and allocating its assets among three separate
subsidiaries.

Each of the corporations performed different

functions and tasks. Although some managerial overlap existed,
the subsidiaries remained separate and distinct.

As such, the

Tax Commission reasonably concluded that the corporations were
separate, that each must bear the responsibilities attendant to
separate corporate existence.

(R. 210-211).

The Tax Commission noted:
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The primary reason for reorganization was to
establish three separate legal entities in
attempt to limit the potential liability from
a then pending lawsuit. It is inconsistent
for the Petitioner on the one hand to argue
that each of the companies was a separate,
independent legal entity and thus insulated
from the liability of either of the others,
yet on the other hand argue that the three
companies are so interrelated that any
transactions between them merely constitute
intracompany transactions and not taxable
transactions.
(R. 212). The Tax Commission's conclusion is consistent with the
reasoning in the Institutional Laundry case, namely, once the
choice is made as to whether a company will exist as an
independent corporation, it must live with the burdens as well as
the benefits.

Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d at 1067. The

Commission's decision is also consistent with other
jurisdictions, which have likewise held that sales between a
parent and a subsidiary were subject to tax.

See Standard

Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Jackson, 735 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1987);
Commissioner of Revenue v. Globe Automatic Vending Co., Inc., 421
N.E.2d 1213, 1214 (Mass. 1981).
In a case similar to the one at brji, 1 his Court held sand
and gravel sales between two inter-related companies constituted
taxable transactions.

See Hales Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. State

Tax Comm'n, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 199?)

In Hales Sand and

Gravel the sand and gravel contractor, Hales, sold materials to
JTN Construction.

JTN is a subcontracting corporation formed by

three of Hales' shareholders in order to obtain federal
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contracts.

Hales argued that because the Utah Department of

Transportation determined that the two corporations constituted a
single unit for the purposes of federal contracts, Hales should
not be liable for sand and gravel sales taxes between itself and
JTN.

This Court rejected Hales' argument and affirmed the Tax

Commission's finding that Hales and JTN were separate legal
entities and that the transactions were subject to sales tax.
Id. at 7.
Petitioners ignore the two Utah cases directly on point
Institutional Laundry and Hales Sand and Gravel and instead rely
upon the definition of a person in the former Sales Tax Act, 5915-2(1) (1986).

That section states:

A 'person' includes any individual, firm,
copartnership, joint adventure, corporation,
estate, or trust, or any group or combination
acting as a unit and in the plural as well as
a singular number unless the intention to
give a more limited meaning is disclosed by
context. (Emphasis added)
In construing similar statutes this Court has applied the
familiar rule of statutory construction "ejusdem generis."
Ponderosa One v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d
635, 637 (Utah 1987).

That maxim states:

Where general words follow specific words in
a statutory enumeration, the general words
are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those objects enumerated by the
proceeding specific words•
Sutherland, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.17
(Singer 5th ed 1992).

The rule accomplishes the purposes of
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giving effect to both the particular and general words by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as extending the provisions of the statute to
everything embraced in that class, though not specifically named
by the particular words. Jjd. at 189.
Using this framework, a limited liability company would be a
"person" under the definition since it is of the same type or
class as the specific words listed but is not among the specific
designations.

In the instance case, Petitioners are each

corporations.

They fall within the specific portion of the

definition.

Being specifically enumerated there is no question

that each corporation is a "person" for purposes of the Sales Tax
Act. Even the language of the statute limits the general language
by stating "unless the intention to give a more limited meaning
is disclosed by the context."5
Petitioners' argument requires several leaps beyond their
initial interpretation of the statute.

The first leap is to the

3

This language was eliminated in the 1987 amendment which
defines person as follows:
Person includes any individual, firm,
partnership, joint venture, association,
corporation, estate, trust, business trust,
receiver, syndicate, this state, any county,
city, municipality, district or other
governmental entity of the state, or any
group or combination acting as a unit.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(5) (1987).
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definition of vendor in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(15) (1987)
which states:
Vendor means any person receiving any payment
or consideration upon a sale of tangible
personal property or any other taxable item
or service under subsection 59-12-103(1), or
to whom such payment or consideration is
payable. (Emphasis added)
Clearly for sales tax purposes any person receiving payment is
the "vendor."

In this instance, the "vendor" which received

consideration upon the sale of tangible personal property was
Harper Excavating, Inc.

The duties of a vendor are set forth in

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107. Petitioners' argue that since the
definition of vendor includes the term "person" and since the
duties of vendors include filing returns (§ 59-12-107(4)(b)),
that Petitioners were justified in filing what they deemed to be
"consolidated returns."6

The Sales and Use Tax Act does not

provide for "consolidated returns."
from corporate franchise tax.

That is a concept borrowed

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-124. It

does not apply to sales tax.

Under the Sales Tax Act "each

vendor" is required to file.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1)(a).

Even if Petitioners' argument is taken at face value the
mere filing of "consolidated returns" does not eliminate the
separate corporate identity.

This Court has recently analyzed

the effect of filing a consolidated return in Savage Indus., Inc.
6

Petitioners' "consolidated returns" were actually
individual returns for each corporation listing all of the
liability on one return and zeros on the others. (T. 111.)
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v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 P. 2d 664 (Utah 1991).

In interpreting

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-108(14) (f) (1987), which prohibits an
acquiring corporation from using pre-acquisition losses of an
acquired corporation, the Court stated that "corporations filing
such returns maintain their separate identities although a single
tax is calculated for the group."

Id. at 10. Thus, even if the

Utah Sales and Use Tax Act did provide that Petitioners could
file a consolidated return, it would be irrelevant in determining
the Petitioners' sales and use tax liability.
Petitioners assertion that the Tax Commission "conceded"
that the Petitioners are "group acting as a unit" for the
purposes of filing consolidated tax returns is disingenuous.
Petitioners cite the prehearing order.
24).

(Petitioners' Brief at

The prehearing order merely states the issues as raised by

Petitioners.
standard.

This cannot be construed as a "concession" by any

Likewise, the manner in which Petitioners may have

elected to file cannot be construed as an "admission" by the
Commission.

The Commission cannot prevent improper filings.

Petitioners assert that someone at the Tax Commission confirmed
that Petitioners were a group or combination acting as a unit
based on Mr. Goddard's vague recollection that he telephoned a
general number for some general clarification.

(T. 54 & 55). An

undocumented response without any knowledge of the question asked
can not be binding on the Tax Commission.

A telephone

conversation to receive answers to general inquires is clearly
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not an agency determination that would be binding under the
standards set by UAPA.

Under UAPA, an agency's determination are

not even binding on the agency itself, so long as the agency
justifies that its departure from prior practices by giving facts
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rationale basis for the
inconsistency.

Hales Sand & Gravel, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-16H(ii);

See also BJ Titan Services

v. State Tax Comm'n. 183 Utah Adv. Rep 20, 26 (1992).

Initial

acceptance of the returns does not prevent correction by audit as
in the instant case.

Therefore, the Tax Commission properly

concluded that even though Petitioners "may indeed have filed a
consolidated sales tax return," that Petitioners should have
reported the transactions between Harper Excavating, Inc. and
Harper Contracting, Inc. as taxable sales.

(R. 212).

Petitioners assertion that they have "reasonably
interpreted" the Sales and Use Tax Act must be disregarded where
their interpretation ignores controlling case law.

Petitioners

"reasonable" explanation does not explain how the definition of
"person" leads to the conclusion that acts between related
corporation are not taxable.

Petitioners tortured construction

of the statutes can not excuse them from the negligence penalty
imposed where there are clear pronouncements of this court
directly on point.
III. SALES TAXES WERE PROPERLY ASSESSED ON THE
TRANSACTIONS.
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Petitioners' voluminous accounting ledgers and canceled
checks conclusively indicate that retail sand and gravel
transactions occurred between the separate entities.
143).

(T. 142-

Here, Petitioners urge this Court to totally disregard

these transactions and to have this Court look only to the
"revised" financial reports.

(Petitioners' Brief at 29, 30, 33).

The Court should find difficulty with this request.

In essence,

Petitioners argue that an after-the-fact adjustment of their
financial records should enable them to be exempt despite the
fact that over a three year period taxable transactions occurred.

Petitioners argue that the audit is based merely on ledger
entries that "record but do not create facts."
v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A 725, 728 (1927).

See, e.g., Loftis

However, this case,

among others, also supports the general rule regarding the
treatment of business records: courts generally consider such
records as prima facie evidence of the facts they state.

See One

In All Corporation v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 132 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1963); (business records when admitted under statute become
prima facie evidence); Frederick J. O'Reilly, v. Cellco Indus.,
Inc., 402 A.2d 686 (Pa. 1978) (corporate ledgers were properly
admitted to determine the amount of unauthorized advances).
The tax in this case is not based on mere paper
transactions, but on real, concrete exchanges of tangible
personal property for consideration between separate corporate
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entities.
created.

There is no question that separate corporations were
There is no question that Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc.

actually extracted gravel, processed, washed, stacked and sold
the gravel to Harper Excavating, Inc.

(R. 117, 118, 209).

Harper also sold sand and gravel to other entities and continues
to do so.

(Respondent's Exhibit 17 p. 3, T. 102). Harper Sand &

Gravel, Inc. paid pit royalties to Rulon Harper for the rights to
extract the gravel sold.

(Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 3, T. 27,

85, 86, 141). Harper Excavating, Inc. sold processed sand and
gravel to Harper Contracting, Inc. (R. 209, T. 61, Respondent's
Exhibits 18 p. 9, 22 p. 9, 26 p. 10). Harper Contracting, Inc.
failed to pay tax on its purchases of sand and gravel from Harper
Excavating, Inc. as well as its purchases from other vendors.
(R. 211, 341-346).
The transactions between Harper Excavating, Inc. and Harper
Contracting, Inc. were no different then the transactions between
Harper Contracting, Inc. and other vendors.

This is not a

situation where nothing happened but mere book entries.

Physical

exchanges of tangible personal property for consideration
occurred over an extended period of time.

Petitioners attempt to

characterize these as mere accounting errors does not alter the
fact that gravel was excavated, processed, hauled, delivered,
sold, paid for and consumed.

Petitioners after-the-fact

characterizations of these transactions do not make them exempt
from taxation.
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Petitioners have attempted to reconstruct their records to
eliminate any taxable transactions.

These "restated" financial

records do not reflect the transactions that actually took place
and are based upon the assumption that an "erroneous" assignment
of the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc. was made at the time of
the corporate reorganization.

In support of its contention,

Petitioner's offer assignment agreements which purport to assign
real property rights to Harper Contracting, Inc.

(R. 584).

These assignments do not effect the taxability of the
transactions which occurred nor do they justify reliance on the
"restated" financial statements created by Petitioners
specifically for the hearing.
First, no "erroneous assignment" of the rights described in
the assignment agreement took place. Although the gravel sale
agreements between Rulon Harper and Harper Excavating, Inc, dated
February 25, 1985, purport to create an interest in real
property, they were not notarized, recorded, nor were they listed
as an asset on the books of Harper Excavating, Inc. at the time
of reorganization.

(R. 572-643, T. 80 & 85). The comptroller,

Steven Goddard, testified that he "took a list of everything we
had, everything that was previously an asset or a liability of
Harper Excavating, Inc. and I divided them up."

(T. 66). Any

rights created by the gravel sale agreement were not listed as an
asset of Harper Excavating, Inc. and therefore could not have
been "erroneously assigned" to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.
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(T.

85).

In fact, Goddard testified that the sand and gravel was not

listed as an asset of any of the companies on reorganization.
(T. 85).
The assumption that Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc. was
"erroneously assigned" the same real property interest
purportedly created by the "secret" gravel sales agreement simply
is not supported by the record.

The record clearly shows that

the gravel sale agreements did not appear as an asset of Harper
Excavating, Inc. prior to reorganization.

(T. 85). Steven

Goddard testified that he took the list of the company's assets
and reassigned them to the newly created companies.

(T. 66).

The assets do not appear on the financial statements of any of
the companies for any of the years in question.

(Respondent's

Exhibits 15-27, T. 80, 81 & 85). The only record evidence that
supports the assumption that any rights created by the gravel
sale agreements were erroneously assigned to Harper Sand and
Gravel, Inc. is contained on page 50 of the transcript, where it
states:
Question: Now it was a fact, wasn't it that
you determined from the accounting stand
point, it made sense to assume that the sand
and gravel company would own whatever there
was to own as far as the — the pits?
Answer:
Yea. I mean, how could it sell
something that it didn't have.
Question: Well, that's right. So you assumed
it should have those assets 'cuz it was the
"sand and gravel company?"
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Answer:

Correct.

This exchange is consistent with Goddard's testimony that
whatever sand and gravel assets were on the books were assigned
to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.. Goddard testified that he had
never seen the gravel sales agreements and that they were not
listed as an asset.

(T. 49, 85). Therefore, any reference that

the gravel sale agreements were "erroneously assigned" must be
read in light of the foregoing facts.
Petitioners brief and arguments below center on the
assumption that the rights created by the gravel sale agreements
and purportedly assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. by Rulon
Harper the day after the corporate organization were somehow
erroneously assigned to Harper Sand and Gravel.
is not correct.

This assumption

All of the evidence in the record indicat'

that

Goddard had no knowledge of either the gravel sale agreements or
any assignments thereof and could not have assigned those rights
in error.

Therefore, Petitioners "restated" financial records

are based upon a faulty premise.
There is likewise no evidence in the record to support
Petitioners' assumption that the gravel purchased by Harper
Contracting, Inc. came from the pits covered by the assignments.
Petitioners maintained a complex accounting system recording each
transaction by truck and by gravel pit.

(R. 646). Therefore,

this information was available to Petitioners and could have been
presented by Petitioners if it would have supported their
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assumption.

As the record stands, Petitioner's offered nothing

to support their assumption that the gravel purchased by Harper
Contracting, Inc. came from pits identified in the gravel sale
agreements.

After the reorganization, Harper Sand and Gravel,

Inc. continued to purchase sand and gravel from Rulon Harper.
(T. 85). Rulon Harper owned the pits where the gravel is and was
being extracted.

(T. 80). This is demonstrated by the following

exchange between Gene Nielson, Petitioner's CPA, and Commissioner
Pacheco (T. 127):
Commissioner Pacheco:
There is not — I
just looked through the financial statements,
there's not a land account in the financial
statements, nor could I find land in any of
the two subsidiaries. Now, where would the - where would you think that the land, —
where the sale of the sand and gravel would
come if there is no land account in any of
these companies?
The witness:
OK. The land is owned by
Rulon Harper personally.
Commissioner Pacheco;
now.

That's what you know

The witness:
And it was at the time also,
and we knew that.
Commissioner Pacheco:
Alright. So it
wasn't a question of who owned the land at
the inception, it was only the assignment
that you were not aware of?
The witness:

Right.

Rulon Harper owned gravel pits not covered by the assignments.
(R. 572, 588, 603, 617, 632). Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.
continued to purchase sand and gravel from pits owned by Rulon
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Harper.

(T. 85, 127). It paid pit royalties to Rulon Harper for

the use of this gravel.
137).

(Respondent's Exhibits 2 & 3, T. 27,

Even after the purported "discovery" of the assignments,

Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. stills sells sand and gravel to
third parties.

(T. 102). Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. sold sand

and gravel during the audit period and is still selling sand and
gravel that it purchases from Rulon Harper.

(Id.),

Rulon Harper

owned the land the sand and gravel was taken from then and owns
it now.

(T. 127).

Harper Contracting, Inc., apparently with full knowledge of
any rights that may have been created by the assignment, signed
by its president7, contracted with Harper Excavating, Inc. for
the purchase and delivery of gravel.
9).

(Respondent's Exhibit 19 p.

Harper Contracting, Inc. also purchased sand and gravel from

third parties during this period.
transactions were taxable.

(R. 339-347).

All of these

(Id.). The record .is clear that

regardless of any rights that may have been created by such an
assignment, Harper Contracting, Inc. purchased substantial
amounts of gravel from both Harper Excavating, Inc. and other
vendors during the audit period.

(T. 61, Petitioner's Exhibits

15-29, R. 339-347).

7

The knowledge of a corporations president is imputed to
the corporation. See City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 762 P.2d
183, 189 (Kan. 1988).
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The assignment documents simply cannot carry Petitioners
argument.

As stated above any rights that may have been created

by the documents were not "erroneously assigned."

Furthermore,

there is no evidence that the documents effectively transferred
any rights.

The documents were not notarized, were not recorded,

and were not acknowledged by the companies comptroller as company
assignments or contracts.

(T. 125). Neither Mr. Goddard or his

successor, Mr. Carston, or the independent C.P.A., Mr. Nielsen,
ever saw the assignments.

(T. 49, 100, 126). They were not

available when the auditors reviewed the company's books and
records.

(T. 142). The record does not indicate whether Harper

Excavating, Inc. or Harper Contracting, Inc. exercised any rights
purportedly granted by the gravel sales agreements or the
assignments of those agreements.
There are several theories regarding the assignments that
are a least as plausible as the assumptions made by Petitioners.
1.

Novation.

If Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. rather than

Harper Contracting, Inc. exercised any contractual rights created
by the gravel sale agreement for an extended period, the parties
may have changed the contract by their actions creating a
novation.
2.

Subsequent Assignment of Rights.

Just as no one in the

company had knowledge of the original assignment, perhaps no one
has knowledge that there was a subsequent assignment of rights.
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3.

Prior Assignment of Rights.

The financial statements

of the companies (Respondent's Exhibit 15-28) state that all
assets were reallocated at the close of business May 9, 1986.
The assignments are dated May 10.

If the gravel sales contracts

had been listed as an asset of Harper Excavating, Inc. they would
have been assigned to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. prior to the
time they were purportedly assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc.
4.

Breach of Contract.

Rulon Harper may have sold sand

and gravel to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. in breach of any
rights created in the gravel sale agreement and subsequent
assignment.
5.

Lack of Consideration.

No rights may have been

created by the gravel sale agreement due to lack of
consideration.

There is no evidence that consideration was given

for any rights created by the contract.

(Nor is there any

evidence other than the unsupported statement in the document
that the assignment itself was supported by consideration).
6.

Abandonment.

The actions of Harper Contracting, Inc.

in apparently not exercising its rights under the assignment may
support an argument that those rights were abandoned.
7.

Mistake.

One could argue that the actions of the

corporation over the audit period, meticulously documented, show
that the assignment was in error rather then the acts of the
corporations.
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There was no "error" made by the comptroller in setting up
the various corporations following reorganization.

He was

apparently given authorization to distribute the assets of Harper
Excavating, Inc. to the newly created corporations. (T. 63). He
took the assets as listed and distributed them.

(T. 66). Any

rights created by the gravel sale contracts and the assignments
thereof were not listed as assets of the corporation and were not
assigned.

(T. 85). The only time any "error" was suspected is

when Petitioners were notified following the audit that they had
created taxable inner-company transactions by the manner in which
they had restructured their corporation.
hindsight, this may have been an error.

(T. 101). In
However, Petitioners,

having elected their corporate form are saddled with the burdens
as well as the benefits of limited liability they hoped to
achieve.

Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d at 1067.

Taxable transactions occurred over the duration of the audit
period.

Tax was not collected or paid.

Petitioners' attempt to

"restate" or recreate the transactions which occuirred do not make
them exempt.

The commission properly assessed liability.

The

commission's decision should therefore be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Because Petitioners failed to timely file for judicial
review, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal and the
appeal should be dismissed.

However, even if this Court finds

that it has jurisdiction, the Court should affirm the Tax
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Commission's Final Decision.

Petitioners reorganized the

original company into separate corporations in order to limit
their potential liability from a pending lawsuit.

Petitioners

seek to disregard the consequences of that choice in an attempt
to limit sales tax liability.

The Court should affirm that once

a corporation chooses the manner in which to operate, it must
bear the risks attendant to separate corporate structure.

The

voluminous ledger entries and canceled checks indicate that sales
of sand and gravel occurred between Harper Excavating, Inc. and
Harper Contracting, Inc.

The Tax Commission properly weighed all

the evidence and determined that sales had in fact occurred
between the subsidiaries.

Such sales are taxable transactions.

Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d 1066. Therefore the order of the
Tax Commission should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this QjQ*

of May, 1993.

CtARK L. S N E L S O U I
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Qj^fr

day of May,

1993, I had delivered four true and accurate copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, to:

Robert A. Peterson
Richard C. Skeen
Robert W. Payne
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL, & MCCARTHY
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Petitioners

Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX 1

SALES AND USE TAX ACT

59-12-102

(a) poultry, dairy, and other livestock feed, and their components;
(b) baling ties and twine used in the baling of hay and straw;
(c) fuel used for providing temperature control of orchards and
commercial greenhouses doing a majority of their business in wholesale sales, and for providing power for off-highway type farm machinery; and
(d) feed, seeds, and seedlings.
(4) (a) "Medicine" means:
(i) insulin, syringes, and any medicine prescribed for the treatment of human ailments by a person authorized to prescribe
treatments and dispensed on prescription filled by a registered
pharmacist, or supplied to patients by a physician, surgeon, or
podiatrist;
(ii) any medicine dispensed to patients in a county or other
licensed hospital if prescribed for that patient and dispensed by a
registered pharmacist or administered under the direction of a
physician; and
(iii) any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a physician or
administered under the direction of a physician or paramedic,
(b) "Medicine" does not include:
(i) any auditory, prosthetic, opthalmic, or ocular device or appliance; or
(ii) any alcoholic beverage.
(5) "Person" includes any individual, firm, partnership, joint venture,
association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate,
this state, any county, city, municipality, district, or other local governmental entity of the state, or any group or combination acting as a unit.
(6) "Purchase price" means the amount paid or charged for tangible
personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection
59-12-103(1), excluding only cash discounts taken or any excise tax imposed on such purchase price by the Federal Government.
(7) "Residential use" means the use in or around a home, apartment
building, sleeping quarters, and similar facilities or accommodations.
(8) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the state of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection
59-12-103(1), other than resale of such property item, or service by a
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer.
(b) "Retail sale" includes sales by any farmer or other agricultural
producer of poultry, eggs, or dairy products to consumers if such sales
have an average monthly sales value of $125 or more.
(9) "Retailer" means a person engaged in a regularly organized retail
business in tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103 (1), and selling to the user or consumer
and not for resale, and includes commission merchants, auctioneers, and
all persons regularly engaged in the business of selling to users or consumers within the state. "Retailer" does not include farmers, gardeners,
stockmen, poultrymen, or other growers or agricultural producers producing and doing business on their own premises, except those who are regularly engaged in the business of buying or selling for a profit. When in the
opinion of the commission it is necessary for the efficient administration
of this chapter to regard salesmen, representatives, peddlers, or can399

59-12-102

REVENUE AND TAXATION

vassers as the agents of the dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers under whom they operate or from whom they obtain the tangible
personal property sold by them, irrespective of whether they are making
sales on their own behalf or on behalf of such dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers, the commission may regard them and may regard
the dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers as retailers for purposes of this chapter.
(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional
or otherwise, in any manner, of tangible personal property or any other
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a consideration. It includes:
(a) installment and credit sales;
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale;
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or entertainment
taxable under this chapter;
(d) any transaction whereby the possession of property is transferred but the seller retains the title as security for the payment of
the price; and
(e) any transaction under which right to possession, operation, or
use of any article of tangible personal property is granted under a
lease or contract and such transfer of possession would be taxable if
an outright sale were made.
(11) "State" means the state of Utah, its departments, and agencies.
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or retention of tangible personal
property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection
59-12-103(1), in this state for any purpose except sale in the regular
course of business.
(13) (a) 'Tangible personal property" means:
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities;
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are
dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged;
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers; and
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, including
property severed from real estate,
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include:
(i) real estate or any interest therein or improvements
thereon;
(ii) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes, and other
evidence of debt;
(iii) insurance certificates or policies;
(iv) personal or governmental licenses;
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs;
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal tender of the
United States or of a foreign nation; and
(vii) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, medallions, or
decorative coins, not constituting legal tender of any nation, with
a gold, silver, or platinum content of not less than 80%.
(14) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over tangible
personal property under Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the
ownership or the leasing of that property, item, or service.
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59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate.
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state;
(b) amount paid to common carriers or telephone or telegraph corporations as defined by § 54-2-1, whether the corporations are municipally or
privately owned, for all transportation, telephone service, or telegraph
service;
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished
for commercial cunsumption;
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished
for residential use;
(e) meals sold;
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation,
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar accommodations;
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other
tangible personal property;
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property;
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and services for less than 30 consecutive days;
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services;
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state.
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection
(1) shall be:
(a) 5-3/32% through December 31, 1989; and
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990.
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be:
(a) 2-3/32% through December 31, 1989; and
(b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990.
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, 9 4; 1933 (2nd
S.S.), ch. 20, 9 1; 1937, ch. I l l , 9 1; C. 1943,
80-15-4; L. 1943, ch. 93, 9 1; 1959, ch. 113,
9 1; 1961, ch. 148, 9 1; 1963, ch. 140, 9 1;
1965, ch. 126, 9 1; 1965, ch. 127, 9 1; 1969,
ch. 187, 9 2; 1969 (lit S.S.), ch. 14, 9 2; 1973,
ch. 153, 9 1; 1975, ch. 179, 9 1; 1977, ch. 220,
9 1; 1983, ch. 258, 9 4; 1983, ch. 270, 9 1;
1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 6, 9 1; 1984, ch. 56, 9 1;
1985, ch. 172, 9 2; 1986, ch. 37,9 2; 1986 (2nd
S.S.), ch. 4, 9 2; C. 1953, 59-15-4; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, 9 23; 1987, ch. 148,
9 6; 1987, ch. 221, 9 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment by Chapter 258, inserted provisions for a
Vi% increase in sales tax from July 1, 1983,
through June 30, 1987; and added the final
paragraph.
The 1983 amendment by Chapter 270 in-

serted the exemption on the sale of currency
and coinage and on gold, silver, and platinum
ingots, bars, medallions and coins in Subsection (a).
The 1983 (1st S.S.) amendment added V2% to
the sales tax rates herein for the period beginning October 1, 1983, and ending September
30, 1984.
The 1984 amendment added 1/2% to the sales
tax rates herein beginning October 1, 1984.
The 1985 amendment substituted "June 30,
1986, (ii) 4»/64% from July 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and (iv) 4lh% from January 1, 1990" for "June 30, 1987 and (ii) 4V2%
from July 1, 1987" in Subsection (a); substituted "June 30,1986,4 M /«% from July 1,1986,
through December 31, 1989, and 4V2% from
January 1,1990" for "June 30,1987 and 4V2%
from July 1,1987" in Subsections (b)(1), (b)(2)
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 53 CJ.S. Licenses § 30.
Key Numbers. — Licenses *» 15.1(1).

59-12-107. Collection of tax — Liability for remittance and
payment of tax — Out-of-state vendors — Returns — Direct payment by purchaser of motor
vehicle — Credits — Use tax receipts — Deposit
and sale of security — Excess amount collected —
Penalties.
(1) (a) Each vendor is responsible for the collection of the sales or use tax
imposed under this chapter.
(b) The vendor is not required to maintain a separate account for the
tax collected, but is deemed to be a person charged with receipt, safekeeping, and transfer of public moneys.
(2) Each person storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property
under Subsection 59-12-103(1), is liable for the use tax imposed under this
chapter.
(3) If any sale of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or
service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), is made by a wholesaler to a retailer,
upon the representation by the retailer that the personal property is purchased by the retailer for resale, and the personal property thereafter is not
resold, the wholesaler is not responsible for the collection or payment of the
tax imposed on the sale, but the retailer is solely liable for the tax.
(4) If any sale of property or service subject to the tax is made to a person
prepaying sales or use tax in accordance with Chapter 51, Title 63, the Resource Development Act, or to a contractor or subcontractor of that person, the
person to whom such payment or consideration is payable, upon the representation by the person prepaying the sales or use tax that the amount prepaid as
sales or use tax has not been fully credited against sales or use tax due and
payable under the rules promulgated by the commission, is not responsible for
the collection or payment of the sales or use tax but the person prepaying the
sales or use tax is solely liable for such payment, if any.
(5) (a) Each vendor shall pay or collect and remit the sales and use taxes
imposed by this chapter if within this state the vendor directly or by any
agent or other representatives: (i) has or utilizes an office, distribution
house, sales house, warehouse, service enterprise, or other place of business; (ii) maintains a stock of goods; (iii) regularly solicits orders
whether or not such orders are accepted in this state, unless the activity
in this state consists solely of advertising or of solicitation by direct mail;
(iv) regularly engages in the delivery of property in this state other than
by common carrier or United States mail; or (v) regularly engages in any
activity in connection with the leasing or servicing of property located
within this state.
(b) If none of the conditions listed under Subsection (a) exist, the vendor is not responsible for the collection of the use tax but each person
storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property is responsible for
remitting the use tax.
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(vii) a notice of anyrightof further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, ( 268; 1988, ch. 72, i 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the
former introductory paragraph in Subsection
(1) as present Subsection (l)(a), substituting
"30 days" for "ten days" in that paragraph, and
redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (d) as

present Subsections (l)(b)(i) to (iv); inserted "or
within the time period provided by agency
rule, whichever is longer" in Subsection (2);
and made minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 3 1 5 ma^es the act effective on January 1,
1933.

63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, thefilingof the request is not
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue
a written order granting the request or denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does
not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-13, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 269; 1988, ch. 72, ft 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25 1988 subdivided Subsection (1) and rewrote Subsection (l)(a), which
had read "Within ten days after the date that
an order on review is issued, or within ten days
after the date that a final order is issued for
which agency review is unavailable, any party
may file a written request for reconsideration

stating the specific grounds upon which relief
is requested"; deleted "or the order on review"
a t the end in Subsection (l)(b); and substituted
Reconsideration" for "rehearing" in Subsection
/o\/u\
w
" £ ..
^ .
,fto. , ,-,
T
. !*!
Ye f
~J*WB 1 9 8 V ch* 1 6 1 ,
* 31& »akes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
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(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(iii) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceedings; or
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that
the requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter.
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section.
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by Section
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter.
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agencyfromenacting rules affecting
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the
requirements of this chapter.
(7) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any provision of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to an agency
of the statefromthe federal government, the applicability of those provisions
to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the
denial. The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature at
its next session.
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action.
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial
review.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-l, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, i 257; 1988, ch. 72, ( 15; 1990,
ch. 306, fi 2; 1991, ch. 207, § 39; 1991, ch.
212, I 5; 1991, ch. 259, t 51; 1992, ch. 30,
{ 128; 1992, ch. 280, ( 57; 1992, ch. 303, ( 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend*
ment, effective March 13, 1990, in Subsection
(2)(c), inserted 'Ho actions and decisions of the
Psychiatric Security Board relating to discharge, conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction," deleted "or mental
institution" after "any correctional facility,"
and inserted "the Utah State Hospital, the
Utah State Training School, or persons in the
custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health."
The 1991 amendment by ch. 207, effective
July 1,1991, substituted "Developmental Center" for Training School" in Subsection (2)(c)
and changed the style of the chapter references
in Subsections (2)(h) and (6).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 212, effective
April 29,1991, in Subsection (2), made a minor
stylistic change in Subsection (f), substituted

"wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and certificates of registrations, and" for "hunting orfiihing licenses, or" in Subsection (n), added the
Subsection (o) designation, and made related
changes
The 1991 amendment by ch. 259, effective
April 1, 1992, in Subsection (2)(f), substituted
'Utah" for "the" and inserted "of 1973"; r*
wrote Subsection (2)(h), which formerly read
"state agency actions under Article 3, Chapter
1, Title 7, and Chapters 2, 8a, and 19, Title 7,
and Chapter 30, Title 63 or judicial review of
those actions;" in Subsection (2)(i), substituted
"Chapter 1, Title 35, Worker's Compensation,
and Chapter 2, Title 35, Utah Occupation*]
Disease Disability Law" for "Chapters 1 and 2,
Title 35"; in Subsection (2)(k), substituted TV
tie 26, Utah Emergency Medical Services Syitern Act, Chapter 11, Title 26, Utah Water Pollution Control Act, Chapter 12, Title 26, Uttb
Safe Drinking Water Act, Chapter 13, Title 26,
Air Conservation Act,, or Chapter 14, Title 26,
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act" for "Chapter
8, 11, 12, 13 or 14, Title 26"; in Subsection
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(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review offinalagency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, S 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered

to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b)" in Subsection (3); and made
minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 ma kes the act effective on January 1,
2988.

63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or
maintains his principal place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed,
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the
agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is
entitled to obtain judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief
requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to
relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
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1

A

Not to my recollection*

2

Q

All right.

Then subsequently, did you review to

3

determine internally what assets were where and how the

4

accounts were running and whether--whether payments were

5

being made back and forth from company to company?

*

A

No.

7

Q

Well, how—as the owner of this business and as

8

the president of this business, what did you do to try to

9

know whether you're making or losing money and whether

10
11

this—this operation is being successful?
A

Well., it—the consolidated financial statements is,

12

all I looked at; as far as the individual companies, if one

13

needed one or one needed the other, it was all transferred

14

back and forth.

15

Q

All right.

Did you have any concern, for instance]

16

about whether Sand & Gravel was making or losing money as

17

opposed to the consolidated result?

18

A

No.

19

Q

And you did sign a lot of checks that went around

20

from company to company and back and forth, didn't you?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And how come—why were you signing these checks?

23

A

Sign all the checks.

24

Q

All right.

25

A

I d o — I look at all the bills and sign all the

For control, to make sure you k n o w —

22

1
2

enough to—you're going to have to give me a better copy.
Q

Okay.

This is under Exhibit No. 6 also, I think

3

this is; Page 6.

4

check, however, it's a little better copy.

5

Page 6 under Exhibit No. 1.

It might be a little bit—it's a different
I think it's

6

A

Okay.

7

Q

Who is that issued to?

8

A

To me.

9

Q

Does it state anything else besides your name on

10

the front of the check?

11

A

Pit royalty.

12

Q

And who is that from?

13

A

Harper Sand & Gravel.

14

Q

Is that your signature on the front?

15

Is that—

is there a signature on there?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

In what capacity have you signed the check?

18

your—in what capacity have you signed—have you placed

19

your, name on the check?

20

what company?

21
22

A

As president, vice president of

No, I don't know what you mean.

I sign on the—

on the checks, what do you—I don't know what you mean.

23

Q

You've signed the check on b e —

24

A

What capacity?

25

In

I don't know what you mean by

that.
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1

Q

You've signed the check on behalf of who?

2

A

Rulon Harper.

3

Q

But what company?

*

Me.
Did you sign the check, for

Harper Sand & Gravel?

5

A

Yeah.

6

Q

But in this check, it says Harper Sand & Gravel;

7

I sign on all of them, yeah.

is that correct?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And is it a fact that at the time you signed

10

this check as president of Harper Sand & Gravel that you

11

knew it was for pit royalties?

12
13
14

A

Yeah.
MR. CARLTON:

At this time, I'd like to introduce

that into the record.

15

MR. PETERSON:

There's no objection.

16

THE HEARING OFFICER:

It's my understanding,

17

Mr. Peterson and Mr. Carlton, that the p l a i n t i f f ' s — o r

18

respondent's documents which are contained in this binder

19

are all at some point going to be introduced into evidence

20

and that you have no objections to them; is that correct?

21

MR. PETERSON:

That is right.

22

THE HEARING OFFICER:

All right.

Then that will

23

be received as well as all of the other documents as you go

24

along, Mr. Carlton.

25

MR. CARLTON:

Okay.
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1

month and you're not—you don't know whether or not you're

2

receiving $11,000 a month under a promissory note?

3

I

THE WITNESS:

4

No.

THE HEARING OFFICER:

I think you testified that

5 | currently all the companies are insured together; is that
6

correct?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE HEARING OFFICER:

9
10

Yes.

And they always have been.
What then was the benefit

t o — t o restructuring because of an insurance problem when
you did in '86?

11

THE WITNESS:

I don't know.

12

better to ask Mr. Skeen that.

13

MR. SKEEN:

I think you'd be

I don't—I—

If you don't mind, let me just

14

explain.

15

couldn't get insurance of the magnitude he needed so that

16

you want a corporation with the rolling stock to be separate

17

of another corporation, s o —

18
19

The benefit of restructuring was because you

THE HEARING OFFICER:

liabilities so they can't get p a s t —

20

MR. SKEEN:

21

THE HEARING OFFICER:

22
23

Is this just to limit his

It's a l l —
— S a n d & Gravel if they went

after Sand & Gravel a n d —
MR. SKEEN:

So they can't get past, that's right,

24

That's it.

And the problem was—was not to buy insurance,

25

the problem was you couldn't buy it. If you could buy it
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1

took place, I just—it was decided to set up four companies,

2

a contracting one, a sand and gravel one and a trucking one,

3

and those were the logical boundaries, and so whatever

4

transactions took place before the reorganization between

5

Rulon and Harper Excavating I assumed took place between

6

Rulon and Harper Sand & Gravel, as far as the gravel was

7

concerned, the land.

8
9
10

Q

All right.

Now, before the reorganization, Harper

Excavating was the only company, so it had—it had the
gravel sales agreements; right?

11

A

I assume so.

12

Q

Okay.

I never saw any.

I—

And so afterwards, it would have been

13 I necessary, would it not, to—for Harper Excavating to assign
14

those sand and gravel agreements to one of the other—to

15

one of the three subsidiaries?

16

A

Yeah, I would—I would do that.

17

Q

Yeah, but did you have the actual assignments

18
19

documents when you started devising this system?
A

No.

There--there really—I mean it all happened

20

so fast, there wasn't much of anything.

21

to work splitting everything apart entirely, as far as the

22

procedures, the accounting and setting up checking accounts

23

and trying to handle just all the paper flow, and you know,

24

the—Dick Skeen started working on putting together all the

25

documentation.
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You know, we went

1

Q

On the legal side?

2

A

On the legal side.

3

Q

Now # it was a fact, wasn't it, that you determined]

4

from the accounting standpoint, it made sense to assume that]

5

the sand and gravel company would own whatever there was to

6

own as far as t h e — t h e pits?

7

8

9

A

Yeah,

I mean, how -could it sell something it

didn't have.

Q

Well, t h a t ' s r i g h t .

So you assumed t h a t i t should]

10

have t h o s e a s s e t s ' c a u s e i t was t h e , q u o t e , "The Sand &

11

Gravel Company"?

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

All right.

And—and

basically operating on that

14

assumption then, you did set up the inter-company

15

in that fashion?

accounts

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And you showed sand and gravel going from the

18

sand and gravel company to excavating, et cetera?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Now, f r o m — i f in fact you had known that Sand &

21

Gravel company didn't own those assets, but in fact they

22

were owned by the contracting company, would you have set

23

up the accounts differently, as far as showing ownership

24

and sales of sand and gravel?

25

A

Yeah.

I mean i f — I would have sold them out of
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1

Q

So you were in the presence at the time Mr. Harper]

2

received some of these checks, statements and invoices; is

3

that correct?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Did he ever say to you that, boy, this is

6

incorrect, you shouldn't be allocating this money or these

7

invoices for these purchases, or anything of that nature?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Did he ever mention your record keeping w^g

10

incorrect?

11

A

No.

12

Q

Even after he saw some of these checks?

13 j

A

No, I just—I told him that I was j u s t —

14

transferred all to my personal account and don't worry

15

about it and he just laughed; he knew he was just putting

16

it from one pocket to another, and so he didn't really—

17

he didn't really care whether what I did was right or wrong

18

To him, the money still stayed in his control.

19
20

Q

Were you ever in the presence when he signed any

of these checks?

21

A

I'm sure I was.

22

Q

D i d — d i d — d o you know if he ever looked at the

23
24
25

I—

check stubs?
A

I think when it came to inter-company transactions]

he pretty much just took my word for whatever was there and
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1

2

3

figured it was all just kind of a big pain anyway.
Q

Do you know if he ever read the checks, what

were on the checks?

4

A

I don't know.

5

Q

Okay.

In your opinion, Mr. Goddard, were the

6

checks signed by Rulon Harper as president of Harper

7

Contracting for consideration to Harper Excavating for the

8

sand and gravel that was flowing back and forth between

9

Harper Sand and Gravel and Harper Excavatingd?

10

A

Well, that was the purpose of all of this was to,

11

you know, H a r p e r — I mean, under the philosophy that I,

12

you know, set up, Harper Sand & Gravel owned some sand and

13

gravel and it needed to go out on a job that was done

14

through Harper Contracting, then we'd have a — a n internal,

15

or an inter-company sale where Harper Sand & Gravel would

16

sell that sand and gravel to Harper Contracting, you know,

17

Harper Sand & Gravel would record it as a receivable,

18

a-counts receivable from Harper Contracting, Harper

19

Contracting would record it as an accounts payable, and

20

t h e n — t h e n we'd write checks, you know, from one c o r p o r a —

21

we'd write a check from Harper Contracting to pay for it.

22
23

Q

Did any of those checks or check stubs state on

there, sand and gravel purchases?

24

A

I don't know.

25

Q

why don't we turn to Exhibit No. 5?
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You have the

1

books?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Would there be paperwork surrounding that sale?

4

A

As much as possible.

5

Q

And you would be aware of that type of transac-

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Were there any sales that you knew of in

6

9
10

On each company's books.

tion?
I would think so.

particular of something of that nature?
A

I don't think there were any.

I think we pretty

11

much set all those up, you know, when we split it out so

12

there wasn't any need to.

13

Excavating owned dump trucks, you know, we--you know, I

14

don't think there was any backhoes put into that corporation]

15

so there wouldn't have been a need to transfer it that way.

16

It was all done right at the start.

17

Q

I mean, one—like Harper

So any of the transfers that you were aware of

18

were made at the time—Kay 10th, I—May 10th, 1986, and you

19

were informed of those?

20

A

Well, I was the one that really did it.

I just

21

took a list of everything we had, everything that was

22

previously an asset and a liability of Harper Excavating

23

and I divided them up, put this backhoe in this corporation

24

and this dump truck in another, and put the debt, any debt

25

associated with that in the proper corporation, to match thej
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1

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

Is that—okay.

And there

2

were all these assets in the company and at the time of

3

reorganization, then you, in communication with the

4

attorney, you broke them out and put them in the companies

5

you thought they should go into, I guess?

6

THE WITNESS:

7

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

Yes.
Okay.

So you—you made the|

8

accounting the best way you thought it had to be done,

9

everything in communication with the other people involved?

10

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

11

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

Okay.

12

is, where—where did this all start?

13

minerals?

14

existed, is t h a t —

15

My first question

Where were the

Was that in the land account that originally

THE WITNESS:

That was a—all f s I knew at the

16

time was that the land was ownfed by Rulon Harper,

17

personally.

18

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

Okay.

And I guess my

19

question is, does that land in which the minerals are

20

being extracted from the sand and gravel?

21

THE WITNESS:

22

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

23
24
25

That's my understanding, yes.
Okay.

And that land

account, was it the land account that was on the books?
THE WITNESS:

No, because it was not owned by the

corporation.
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1
2

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

would not have had any knowledge about t h a t —

3

THE WITNESS:

4

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

5

So it was outside and you

No.
— p i t , or I refer to it as

a mineral, meaning the raw material.

6

THE WITNESS:

7

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

8

it then in that sense?

9

THE WITNESS:

That's okay.

No.

So you did not account for

There was no asset called land

10

on the books of Harper Excavating prior to the reorganiza-

11 I

tion 'cause it wasn't owned by the corporation.

12

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

Okay.

My next question

13

h a s — d e a l s w i t h — y o u stated that the CPA firm prepared

14

audited financial statements on a consolidated basis for a

15

period after t h e — a f t e r the reorganization?

16
17
18

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

I believe we had individual

ones as well.
COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

Okay.

Just focusing on the

19

consolidated, was there a — i n t h e — a n y indication in the

20

financial statements, a note to the financial statement

21

that there was a lease or an assignment or a significant

22

transaction that took place between any of the parties

23

regarding the extraction?

24
25

THE WITNESS:

Well, I think there was

the—the

traditional related party transaction footnote that, you
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1

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

2

Okay.

THE HEARING OFFICER:

3

Mr. Goddard.

4

That's fine

I had a question,

Now you stated that prior to reorganization,

t h e — t o your knowledge, the land from which the sand and

5

gravel was extracted belonged to Rulon Harper; is that

6

correct?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

Yes

THE HEARING OFFICER:

9

And that wasn't carried

on the books of Harper Excavating as an asset; is that

10

|

11

I

THE WITNESS:

12

|

THE HEARING OFFICER:

13

|

zation, you then included the sand and gravel land as an

14

I

asset in one of the companies; is that correct?

correct?
That's correct.

15 I

THE WITNESS:

16

THE HEARING OFFICER:

17

THE WITNESS:

18

I

THE WITNESS:

20
21

J

25

No.
What did you do

I did exactly what was being done

Sand

& Gravel—Harper

Sand & Gravel instead of Harper

Excavating

3

24

You didn't?

before the reorganization, after; j u s t — j u s t it went through)

22
2

No

THE HEARING OFFICER:

19

And then after the reorgani-|

THE HEARING OFFICER:
I

So you were assuming then

that Sand & Gravel was continuing to pay Mr. Harper
personally f o r — f o r t h e — f o r the sand and g r a v e l —
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1

THE WITNESS: Yes.

2

THE HEARING OFFICE"R:

3

THE WITNESS: Yes.

4

THE HEARING OFFICER:

5

—extracted; is that right?

So it wasn't carried as an

asset per se, but—

6

THE WITNESS: No.

7

THE HEARING OFFICER:

—simply as a purchase from

8

Mr. Harper and then a sale to Harper Excavating; is that

9

correct?

10 1

THE WITNESS:

Yeah, that's correct.

11

THE HEARING OFFICER:

Okay, thank you.

I have no

12 1 further questions.
13 •

MR. PETERSON:

Just—your question, when you

1

14 I asked him, you said it continued to be that way; it didn't
15

continue because Sand & Gravel wasn't in existence, it was

16

new.

17

reorganization.

There was no Sand & Gravel company prior to the

18

THE HEARING OFFICER:

19

MR. PETERSON:

20

THE HEARING OFFICER:

21

Thank you, Mr. Goddard.

22

MR. PETERSON:

I understand that.

Okay.
Thank you.
You may step down.

One question I think you might—

23

and I think you might have been misled Commissioner

24

Pacheco about.

25

86
•

m.

%

_

.

1

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And H a r p e r — w h y does Harper Contracting pay?

3

A

Because I have n o w — w e ' v e got the gravel sale

Harper Contracting pays Rulon.

4

agreements in place as far as who owns the tract of land

5

within the gravel pits, and Harper Contracting has legal

6

title to those tracts of land.

7

Q

And as far as any promissory notes on past due

8

sales, are those the responsibility of Harper Contracting

9

or Harper Sand & Gravel?

10
11
12

A

That note that was first brought up has now been

rewritten in Harper Contracting.
Q

I'm going to pass to you Plaintiff's Exhibits 1

13

through 10 which are gravel sales agreement and assignments

14

of gravel sales agreements, and ask you if you are familiar

15

with these documents.

16
17
18

Why don't I just break them all apart

THE HEARING OFFICER:

Are those the documents

that are attached to your brief, Mr. Peterson?
MR. PETERSON:

Probably.

I'm trying to remember,

19

I think they are among the documents that are attached.

20

I've written too many briefs lately, I can't remember.

21

I'll gust distribute these, one copy for both of you.

22

Those are the same, are they not?

23

THE HEARING OFFICER:

I think so.

24

MR. PETERSON:

25

There are--I think I did not have, for some

Okay.
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1

2
3
4

A

Well, we were operating as o n e — a s one company

and it was treated as such.
Q

And so it was all a wash-out in the inter-company

accounts?

5

A

Correct.

6

Q

And as far as sales taxes on a consolidated basis,

7

did it make any difference?

8

A

No,

9

Q

Now, f r o m — o n an ongoing basis then, on a current

10

account basis, are there any sales for inter-company

11

obligations reflected on the ledgers currently for sales

12

of sand and gravel from the sand and gravel company to

13

Excavating or to Contracting?

14

A

There is an inter-company transaction between

15

Contracting and Sand & Gravel now, because Sand & Gravel

16

still operates the gravel pit operations and they will

17

sell sand and gravel to outside vendors, and there is a

18

transaction that is created for the sale between Contracting

19

and Sand & Gravel, an exempt sale, and then Harper Sand &

20

Gravel then sells it to an outside vendor and collects

21

sales tax and w e remit the sales tax on our sales tax

22

return.

23

Q

But Harper Contracting no longer purchases sand

24

and gravel?

25

A

No.

102

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Okay.

3

MR. PETERSON:

4

THE HEARING OFFICER:

5

MR. CARLTON:

6
7

8
9

I have no further questions.
Mr. Carlton?

Yeah, I have a couple questions.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. CARLTON:
Q

Is it standard procedure for an auditor to go

through and look at all the contracts and assignments?

10

A

Yeah, anything that's material to the financial

11

statements.

12

Q

And your testimony I guess is then that those

13

were not present at the time that you were looking at the

14

books?

15

A

D i d n ' t — d i d not o b t a i n them.

16

Q

Did you ask for them?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Wh o did you ask for those documents?

19

A

The comptroller.

20

Q

And his name is?

21

A

Steve Goddard.

22

Q

And Mr. Goddard represented that what he gave you

23

was the totality of all the documents; is that correct?

24

A

Yeah.

25

Q

Can you remember when that took place?
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1

A

When what took place?

2

Q

When you met--you met with them yearly; was there

3

a certain period of time that that would have occurred

4

each year, or is i t —

5

A

Yeah, it would—for this financial statement, it

6

would have occurred approximately—we would have probably

7

met right near the end of February of '87, and then through-

8

out the period of the audit, which would have extended from

9

probably the first part of March until the report date.

10

Q

So annually you would meet with Mr, Goddard and

11

go over the contracts and assignments that—that Harper

12

Investment, Harper Sand & Gravel and the other companies

13

entered into; is that correct?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And each year he represented that these are the

16

totality of all the assignments and contracts that I have

17

in m y —

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And for each of those years, you never saw the

20

assignments that you're basing your amended financial

21

statements on?

22

A

Right.

23

Q

Were you privileged to see the agreements—I'm

24

not talking about the assignments, I'm talking about the

25

agreements?
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A

The agreements where the companies split up?

Q

No.

The agreements--the agreement between the

3

Harpers and Harper Excavating to sell this sand and

4

gravel?

5

A

Did not see those-

6

Q

Did you have any meetings about these types of

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

financial statements with Mr, Harper at any time?
A

At the end of the audit, we always meet and go

over the financial statements.

Mainly, we talk about the

consolidated re—financial statement.
Q

Can you remember if you went over the financial

statement you have in front of you with Mr. Harper?
A

I cannot.

He's interested in the consolidated,

1*

and I know we go over that; as far as if we go over each

15

of the individual, or if we did at this point in time, I

16

cannot say

17

Q

18

statements?

19

A

I'm not sure if we gave them directly to him

20

Q

Do you know if he made any comments about your

21

22 I

Did you present Mr. Harper with all these financial

financial statement, your report?

A

I can't—I can't recall any.
I have no further ques>tions.

23

MR. CARLTON:

24

THE HEARING OFFICER: Any redirect, Mr. Peterson?

25

MR. PETERSON:

No.
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1
2

THE HEARING OFFICER:
questions?

3
4

Commissioner Pacheco, any

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

One question.

The Harper

Contracting Company was selling sand and gravel, okay?

5

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

6

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

There is n o t — I just

7

looked through the financial statements, there's not a

8

land account in the financial statements, nor could I find

9

land in any of the other two subsidiaries.

Now, where

10

would the—where would you think that the land—or the sale

11

of sand and gravel would come from if there's no land

12

account in any of the companies?

13

THE WITNESS:

14

Okay.

The land is owned by Rulon

Harper personally.

15

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

16

THE WITNESS:

17

That's what you now know.

And it was at that time also, and wej

knew that.

18

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

All right.

So it wasn't

19

a question of who owned the land at inception, it was only

20

the assignment you were not aware of?

21

THE WITNESS:

22

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

23

THE WITNESS:

24

COMMISSIONER PACHECO:

25

Right.
Okay.

Right.
That's all the questions I

have.
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*

ended February 29th, 1988. *Go to Page 4, you'll again see

2

the income as reported on the financial statement for

3

Harper Con—for Harper Excavating and you'll see that

4

amount is $6,262,769, which is the same figure that's

5

reported on the income tax return.

6

And then if you go to Page 8 of Exhibit 22, you

7

see a statement at the bottom* of that Statement No. 6,

8

related party transactions where it says the company—

9

speaking of Harper Excavating—has entered into an agreement]

10

with a wholly-owned subsidiary of its parent company to

11

sell sand and gravel and provide the hauling of material

12

to job sites.

13

income of $4,436,237 are included in the financial statement]

14

as part of the contracting income for the year ended

15

February 29, 1988.

16

Sand and gravel sales and material hauling

So of that $6 million figure that's on the

17

financial statement and the income tax return for Harper

18

Excavating, $4,436,237 of that represents the sale from

19

Harper Excavating to Harper Contracting.

20

And then just one last overlay.

I'd just like

21

to document with this overlay as noted in the left-hand

22

corner the royalty, pit royalty payments from Harper Sand

23

& Gravel to the owners of the pits, and that refers to

24

Exhibit No. 1.

25

i can't see the amount, to Rulon Harper, for pit royalties

You see the first check there is made out,
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1

Q

I—I remember those checks.

2

A

— p i t royalties.

3

Q

That's right, and I understand the conclusion you

4

drew from those checks; but I'm just—if we confine

5

ourselves now to these income statements, I don't think

Q

that we'll find any sand and gravel listed as an asset.

7

Now, can it—in terms of sales taxes, can a

8

company, wholly apart from sales taxes, can a company sell

g

something to someone if it doesn't own it?

10
11
12

A

I guess if it doesn't belong to them, no, they

couldn't do that.
Q

All right. And when you—when you conducted this

13

audit, or when your staff did and you reviewed it, you were,

14

in a sense, dependent upon the—the records and the

15

information and other things provided to you by the company;

16

were you not?

17

A

Yes.

That's correct.

18

Q

All r i g h t .

And are you familiar with—I d o n ' t

19

want to overstate it; but are you familiar with computers

20

at all?

Do you know the GIGO principle?

21

A

I don't believe I do, no.

22

Q

GIGO principle is garbage in garbage out, and I

23

don't want to—I'm not trying to be perjorative, but that's

24
25

just another way of stating that if you've got that
information, you're going to get that results; isn't that
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1

true?

2

3

I

A

I guess that would be true.

Q

And it is the unfortunate case, is it not, that

4

when you were doing your audit, when your staff was out

5

there, the company d i d n ' t — d i d n ' t give you, Mr. Goddard

6

didn't give you, Mr. Carston, they just didn't have, in the

7

stuff you looked at, t h o s e — t h o s e sales contracts and the

8

assignments weren't there for you, were they?

9

A

That is correct.

10

Q

And so you w e r e — i n a sense, you're handicapped,

11

you're n o t — y o u ' r e not given everything you need?

12

A

Obviously we were not.

13

Q

Now—

14
15

MR. PETERSON:
questions.

I d o n ' t — I don't have any further

Thank you.

16

THE HEARING OFFICER:

17

MR. CARLTON:

18

THE HEARING OFFICER:

Redirect, Mr. Carlton?

No redirect.
I have a question,

19

Mr. Ashcroft.

20

assignments and sales contracts change your determination

21

of whether or not a taxable transaction occurred between

22

two entities in question?

23

Does the fact that you now know of those

THE WITNESS:

I don't think it does, as I've

24

just demonstrated through the overlays, you can see that

25

there are transactions occurring between those different
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REPORT OF CERTIFIED PUBLH ACCOUNTANTS
Board ol Ducetors and lit ut k! n I dlt i
Harper Sand and Gravel, Inr
Ue ha it examined the statement of financial position of Harper Sand and
Gravel, Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and the related statements of income and
retained earnings, and changes in financial position for the period from May
10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly,
included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our npinion, the financial statements referred to above present ianly
the financial position of Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc., as ol February 28, 1987
and the results of its operations and changes in its financial position for the
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February ?B, 1Q87 in nnformity
with generally accepted accounting principles,
Our examination was made primarily for Lin puipose of forming an opinion
on the basic financial statements taken as a whole. The accompanying
supplementary financial information is not considered necessary lor a
tan
presentation of the basic financial statements and is presented for analytical
purposes only. The supplementary information was derived from the accounting
records tested by us as part of our examination of the aforementioned financial
statements and, in our opinion, is fairly stated in all material respects in
relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole.

May 8, 1QR7

HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL. INC.
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION
February 28, 1987

ASSETS
Current Assets:
Cash
Accounts receivable (net of allowance
for doubtful accounts of $2,000)
Receivables from related e n t i t i e s

$

76,096
503,257

Total current assets

583,477

Equipment:
Construction equipment
Crushing equipment

Less:

004,430
397T390
1,061,846

Accumulated depreciation

803,465

Net equipment

Total Assets

Continued on next page -
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258,381
$

841,858

STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION

(continued)

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS1 EQUITY
fnrrpnt Liabilities:
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses
Income taxes payable
Payables to related entities
Current portion of long-term dc'lln
Total LUireuL liabilities

Long-term debt, excluding cuirent portion
Commi tment
Total liabilities
Stockholders1 Equity:
Common stock; no par, stated value $100,
authorized 50,000 shares, issued and
outstanding 1,000 shares
Additional paid-in capital
Retained earnings
Total stockholders1 equity
Total Liabilities and Stockholders1 Equity

The accompanying notes are an integral
part of the financial statements.

$ A,!?1!
4,939
2,825
120,450
165,994
298,333

191,001
—
489,334

100,000
211,030
41,494
352,524

$841,858

HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC,
STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND RETAINED EARNINGS
For the Period From May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987

INCOME:
Contracting income
Direct costs

$1,753,217
1,481,668

Gross profit

271,549

EXPENSES:
General and administrative
Interest

242,130
25,885
268,015

Net operating income

3,534

OTHER INCOME:
Interest income
Other income

26,189
446

Income before provision for income taxes

30,169

Income tax benefit

11,325

Net Income

Retained earnings, beginning of period
Add:

$

41,494

$

-041,494

Net income

Retained earnings, end of period

The accompanying notes are an integral
part of the financial statements.

$

41,494

HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC.
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION
For the Period From May lu, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987
. -- Provided:
From operations:
Net income
Items which do not use (piuvide)
working capital:
Depreciation
Deferred taxes
Working capital prr •li' • n.1

$ 41,494
119,844
(14,150)
H-,188

From other sources:
Long-term debt borrowings
Issuance of common stock
Total n . : ^ provided

335,190
311,030
793,408

Funds Appl; _ „_
Acquisition of equipment
Current maturities and repayment of
long-term debt
• Long-term, assets less long-term liabilities
spun off from Harper Excavating, Tnr
Total funds applied

120,468

194,378
508,264

iii J ease in working Capital

$285,144

Changes in Components of Working Capital:
Increase (decrease^ in current assets:
Cash

"|i

Accounts receiva:
R e c e i v a b l e fr-*- *

*b,uVw
503,257
583,477

ed entities

• (Increase) decrease in curreiit " " V !'.' *.e :
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses
Income taxes payable
Payables to related entities
Current portion of long-term debt

^- (4,125)
(4,939)
(2,825)
(120,450)
(165,994)
(298,333)

Increase in Working Capital

iiie accompanying notes are an i n t e g r a l
part of the financial statements.

$285,144

HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC.
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1.

Summary of S i g n i f i c a n t Accounting P o l i c i e s
a.

Business Information
On May 10, 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. performed a tax free
reorganization pursuant to section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code.
As a result of this reorganization, three new corporations were
formed.
At the close of business on May 9, 1986 Harper Excavating, Inc.
transferred at book value all fixed assets and liabilities relating
to the sand and gravel operations to Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc., in
exchange for 1,000 shares of Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc. no par common
stock. Harper Excavating, Inc. then changed its corporate name to
Harper Investments, Inc. and Harper Investments, Inc. changed its
corporate name to Harper Excavating, Inc. The Company was organized
to carry on sand and gravel operations.

b.

Equipment and Depreciation
Equipment is stated at cost. Depreciation is provided on the
straight-line method over a 3 to 8 year period. Major replacements
which extend the useful lives of equipment are capitalized and
depreciated over the remaining useful life. Normal maintenance and
repair items are charged to costs and expenses as incurred.
The Company uses accelerated methods of depreciation for income tax
purposes. These methods provide more depreciation expense in the
early years than in the later years of the life of the asset.
Upon the retirement or disposal of equipment, the costs and related
. accumulated depreciation amounts are eliminated and any gain or loss
is included in operations in the year of disposition,

c.

Income Taxes
Income tax expense is provided based on earnings reported for
financial statement purposes. Certain items of income and expense
are recognized in different periods for tax and financial accounting
purposes. The timing difference is created by other accounting
methods used for depreciation for tax reporting purposes, the effects
of such difference is reported as deferred income taxes.

Harper Sand and Gravel, I n c .
Notes to Financial Statements • • contii lueri
Receivables/Payables with Related Entities
Receivables from Uif« Parent Company at February 2 8 , 1 9 8 / , r e p r e s e n t s
receivables for cash deposits made into the Parent Company cash accounts.
R e c e i v a b l e s from a w h o l l y - o w n e d s u b s i d i a r y ui L lie I'uiunL L u m p a n y
represents receivables due from sand and gravel sold to the company,
Payables lo i.he Parent Company r e p r c ^ ^ a u an.oi*,..w -.-^ ^ ] management fees
charged and other miscellaneous expenses paid for bv the Parent Company,
Payables Mi olht«i w h o l l y - o w . ^ « i^u..^ , ,«** A c
. LUG raiem oompany
represents rental charged for the use of tru^^^, fuel and repairs and
maintenance of equipment,
Following is a schedule of the receivables/payableParent Company
Other wholly-owned subsidiaries
of the Parent Company

$469,029

$

33,628
$503,257

48,384
$120,450

The amounts receivable/payable are n o n i nterest bearing and are expected
to be collected/paid in 1987
Income Taxes
P r o v i s i o n for income taxes i s made based, on earnings reported m Hie
financial statements for the amount of income taxes payable currently and
in the future (deferred income taxes)*
Deferred taxes arise from
computing depreciation using accelerated methods for tax purposes.
.Deferred taxes attributable to the amounts attributable to accelerated
depreciation are shown as long-term.
The (provision) benefit; for income taxes consists of the following:
Current income taxes:
Federal provision
State provision
Current income tax expense
Deferred i.' ' i
f

t

(Provision) benefit for
income taxes

$
"

tl,100)
(725)
(.',825)
!»>, I JO

$ 11,325

Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued
4.

Long-Term Debt
Long-term debt obligations at February 28, 1987 consist of the following:
10.25% and 12.75% notes payable, due
in monthly installments of $8,596 and
$3,036 including interest. Notes are
due March 1988 and December 1989,
secured by equipment.

$273,577

Prime + 1% note payable due in monthly
installments of $2,381 including
interest due May 1988, secured by
equipment.

30,917

Prime + .9% note payable, due in monthly
installments of $1,944 plus interest
due July 1989, secured by equipment.

52,501

Total long-term debt
Less current portion of long-term debt
Total long-term debt excluding
current portion

356,995
165,994
$ 191,001

Aggregate maturities of long-term debt in each of the next five years are
as follows: 1988 - $165,994, 1989 - $119,274, 1990 - $ 71,727, 1991 - $
— , 1992 - $ —
.
Equipment pledged as collateral for the
above existing debt obligations:
Construction equipment
Less: Accumulated depreciation
Book value of pledged equipment

$982,893
678,255
$304,638

Of the above book value of pledged equipment, $154,788 is also pledged as
collateral for debt obligations of related Companies.
5.

Related Party Transactions
The Company sells sand and gravel to a wholly-owned subsidiary of its
Parent Company. Sand and gravel sales of $1,049,979 are included in the
financial statements as part of contracting income for the period ended
February 28, 1987. The Company shows a receivable from this company in
the amount of $30,056 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to sand and
gravel sales.

H a r p e r Sand and Gravel, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued
The Corrcaii; ..±. its equipment maintained and repaired by a wholly-owned
subsidiary of its Parent Company. Maintenance and repairs of $380,528 are
included in the financial statements as part: of di recti costs for the
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this
company in the amount of $44,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related
to these maintenance and repairs.
The Company also uses tu ticks owned bj a who'll y-owned subsidiary of its
Parent Compai :i]
R> = •• ite .3 expense for these trucks amounted to $1,065 and
are included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this
company in the amount of $1,065 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related
to truck rentals.
The Company has also entered into an agreement with its Parent Company,
'whereby it pays a monthly management fee :' *r re . rd keeping and management
services provided by the Parent Company. Management fees, pursuant to
this agreement, of $179,750 are included in the financial statements for
the period ended February 28, 1987 The Company shows a payable to its
.Parent Company in the amount of $32,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2)
related to management fees,
6.

Employee Benefit Plans
The Corrpany has a contributory profit sharing and retirement plai- ;o. . *
benefit of all employees who have completed one year of service (1.000
hours) and attained the age of 25. The plan provides for normal
retirement on the anniversary of the plan nearest the 65th birthday and
participants become fully vested after 10 years of sei vice.. The Company
may make contributions to the plan out of its net or cumulative earnings •
At February 28, 1987 the Company accrued no contributions to the plan.

1.

C
The Company entered into an agreement on June 12, 1986 with its Parent
Company to pay $700,000, due in annual installments of $70,000 together
with accrued interest on February 25 until paid. The interest rate is
based on the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect
in the month of January in the year preceding the year each payment i s
due.
Cash payments on the commitm*"*
^'
made in the form ::)f
dividends
The Parent Company has a secured interest in. all
accounts receivable and equipment of the Company.

personal *v^«~-*«

HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

HARPEk bAtiD MD GRAVEL, INC.
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
noc
/T
For the Period From May '
r\ception) through February 28, T9P7

Advertising
Bad debts
Bank charges
Insurance
Management fees
Office supplies
Repairs and .maintenance
Taxes, licenses and permits
Telephone and utilities
Miscellaneous
G&NEHAI, , .ITf1"" , \\f\l M ::IKA1I VK EXPANSES

2,038
93
44,301
179,750
3,201
4,260
1,232
6,293
803
$242,130

RESPONDENT'S EXHTRTT IR
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REPORT OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Board of Directors and Stockholders
Harper Excavating, Inc.
We have examined the statement of financial position of Harper Excavating,
Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and the related statements of (loss) and retained
earnings (deficit), and changes in financial position for the period from May
10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly,
included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly
the financial position of Harper Excavating, Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and
the results of its operations and changes in its financial position for the
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987, in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.
Our examination was made primarily for the purpose of forming an opinion
on the basic financial statements taken as a whole. The accompanying
supplementary financial information is not considered necessary for a fair
presentation of the basic financial statements and is presented for analytical
purposes only. The supplementary information was derived from the accounting
records tested by us as part of our examination of the aforementioned financial
statements and, in our opinion, is fairly stated in all material respects in
relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole.

S fftona+r,, C&€~t> /A?**,

May 8, 1987

HARPER EXCAVATING, INC.
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION
February 28, 1987

ASSETS
Current Assets:
Cash
Accounts receivable
Receivables from related entities
Total current assets

Building and Equipment:
Building
Shop equipment
Construction -equipment

$ 127,953
1,800
348,705
478,458

54,311
30,259
2,181,141
2,265,711

Less:

Accumulated depreciation

Net building and equipment

Total Assets

Continued on next page -

1,802,078
463,633

$ 942,091

(continued)

STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS1 EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses
Payables to related entities
Current portion of long-term debt
Total current liabilities

Long-term debt, excluding current portion
Commitment
Total liabilities
Stockholders1 Equity:
Common stock; no par, stated value $100,
authorized 50,000 shares, issued and
outstanding 1,000 shares
Additional paid-in capital
Retained earnings (deficit)
Total stockholders1 equity

Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity

The accompanying notes are an integral
part of the financial statements.

308,039
25,035
112,904
72,031
518,009

41,473
—
559,482

100,000
357,319
(74,710)
382,609

$942,091

HARPER EXCAVATING, INC.
STATEMENTS OF (LOSS) AND RETAINED EARNINGS (DEFICIT)
For the Period from May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987

INCOME:
Contracting income
Direct costs

$4,732,603
4,328,807

Gross profit

403,796

EXPENSES:
General and administrative
Interest

534,502
16,047
550,549

Net operating (loss)

(146,753)

OTHER INCOME:
Interest income
Rental income
Other income

1,006
15,682
10»705

(Loss) before provision for income taxes

(119,360)

Income tax benefit

44,650

Net (Loss)

$

Retained earnings, beginning of period
Add:

$

Net (loss)

(74,710)

-0~
(74,710)

Retained earnings (deficit), end of period

Tfte accompanying notes are an integral
part of the financial statements.

$

(74,710)

HARPER EXCAVATING, INC,
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN' FINANCIAL POSITION
For the Period from May'10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987

Funds Provided:
From operations:
Net (loss)
Items which do not use (provide)
working capital:
Depreciation
Deferred taxes
Working capital provided by operations
From other sources:
Long-term debt borrowings
Issuance of common stock
Total funds provided
Funds Applied:
Acquisition of equipment
Current maturities and repayment of
long-term debt
Long-term assets less long-term liabilities
spun off from Harper Excavating, Inc.
Total funds applied
(Decrease) in Working Capital

Changes in Components of Working Capital:
Increase (decrease) in current assets:
Cash
Accounts receivable
Receivables from related entities

(Increase) decrease in current liabilities:
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses
Payables to related entities
Current portion of long-term debt
(Decrease) in Working Capital

The accompanying notes are an integral
part of the financial statements.

$(74,710)

218,671
(44,650)
99,311

47,110
457,319
603,740

59,865
135,876
447,550
643,291
$(39,551)

$127,953
1,800
348,705
478,458

(308,039)
(25,035)
(112,904)
(72,031)
(518,009)
$(39,551)

HARPER EXCAVATING, INC.
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

1.

Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
a#

Business Information
On May 10, 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. performed a tax free
reorganization pursuant to section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code.
As a part of this reorganization, three new corporations were formed.
At the close of business on May 9, 1986 Harper Excavating, Inc.
transferred at book value all fixed assets and liabilities relating
to the trucking operations to Harper Investments, Inc., in exchange
for no par common stock. Harper Excavating, Inc. then changed its
corporate name to Harper Investments, Inc. and Harper Investments,
Inc. changed its corporate name to Harper Excavating, Inc.
The Company was organized to carry on trucking operations and perform
repairs and maintenance for other wholly-owned subsidiaries of its
Parent Company.

b.

Building, Equipment and Depreciation
Building and equipment are stated at cost. Depreciation is provided
on the straight-line method on the estimated lives of the various
classes of assets.
Building is depreciated over 15 years and
equipment over a 3 to 8 year period. Major replacements which extend
the useful lives of equipment are capitalized and depreciated over
the remaining useful life. Normal maintenance and repair items are
charged to costs and expenses as incurred.
The Company uses accelerated methods of depreciation for income tax
purposes. These methods provide more depreciation expense in the
early years than in the later years of the life of the asset.
Upon the retirement "or disposal of equipment, the costs and related
accumulated depreciation amounts are eliminated and any gain or loss
is included in operations in the year of disposition.

c.

Income Taxes

Income tax expense i s provided based on earnings reported for
financial statement purposes. Certain items of income and expense
are recognized in different periods for tax and financial accounting
purposes.
The timing difference i s created by other accounting
methods used for depreciation for tax reporting purposes, the effects
of such difference i s reported as deferred income taxes.

Harper Excavating. Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued
2.

Receivables/Pavables with Related Entities
Receivables from the Parent Company at February 28, 1987, represents
receivables for cash deposits made into the Parent Company cash accounts
and rental charged for the use of the Company's trucks.
Receivables from other wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Parent Company
represents sale of sand and gravel, hauling of material, sale of fuel and
repairs and maintenance of equipment.
Payables to the Parent Company represents amounts due for management fees
charged and other miscellaneous expenses paid for by the Parent Company.
Payables to other wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Parent Company
represents sand and gravel purchases by the company.
Following is a schedule of receivables/payables with related entities:

Parent Company
Other wholly-owned
subsidiaries of the
Parent Company

Receivables
$ 48,010

Payables
$ 82,848

300,695
$348,705

30,056
$112,904

The amounts receivable/payable are non-interest bearing and are expected
to be collected/paid in 1987.
3,

r.

Income Taxes
Provision for income taxes is made based on earnings reported in the
financial statements for the amount of income taxes payable currently and
in the future (deferred income taxes). Deferred taxes arise from
computing depreciation using accelerated methods for tax purposes.
Deferred taxes attributable to the amounts attributable to accelerated
depreciation are shown as long-term.
The (provision) benefit for income taxes consists of the following:

Current income taxes:
Federal provision
State provision

$

—
—

Current income tax expense
Deferred tax benefit
(Provision) benefit for
income taxes

44,650

$ 44,650

Harper Excavating, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued
The current year loss of the Company will be made available as an offset
against other taxable income by filing a consolidated tax return with its
Parent Company and other wholly-owned subsidiaries for the current year.
4.

Long-Term Debt
Long-term debt obligations at February 28, 1987 consist of the following:
9.5% and 10.25% notes payable, due in
monthly installments of $605 and $865
including interest due November 1990
and March 1987 respectively, secured
by equipment.

$ 44,800

Prime + 1% note payable, due in monthly
installments of $5,291 including interest
due May 1988, secured by equipment.
Total long-term debt
Less current portion of long-term debt
Total long-term debt excluding
current portion

68,704
113,504
72,031
$

41,473

Aggregate maturities of long-term debt in each of the next five years are
as follows: 1988 - $72,031, 1989 - $25,628, 1990 - $9,179, 1991 - $6,666,
1992 - $ —
.
Equipment pledged as collateral for the
above existing debt obligations:
Construction equipment
Less: Accumulated depreciation
Book value of pledged equipment

5.

$268,995
110,774
$158,221

Related P a ^ y Transactions
The Company has entered into an agreement with a wholly-owned subsidiary
of its Parent Company to sell sand and gravel and provide the hauling of
material to job sites. Sand and gravel sales and material hauling income
of M A^O Q32 are included in the financial statements as part of
cont^
for t h e P e r i o d e n d e d ^bruary 28, 1987. The Company
shows a receivable from this company in the amount of $143,474 as of
February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to this income.

Harper Excavating, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued
The Company maintains and repairs equipment for wholly-owned subsidiaries
of its Parent Company. ' Maintenance and repairs of $1,149,435 are included
in the financial statements as part of contracting income for the period
ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a receivable from these
companies in the amount of $137,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2)
related to these maintenance and repairs.
The Company also rents trucks owned by it to these companies. Rental
income for these trucks amounted to $15,682 and are included in the
financial statements as rental income for the period ended February 28,
1987. The Company shows a receivable from these companies in the amount
of $15,682 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to these truck
rentals*
The Company has also entered into an agreement with its Parent Company,
whereby it pays a monthly management fee for record keeping and management
services provided by the Parent Company. Management fees, pursuant to
this agreement, of $318,250 are included in the financial statements for
the period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to its
Parent Company in the amount of $36,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2)
related to management fees.
The Company also purchases sand and gravel from a wholly-owned subsidiary
of its Parent Company. Sand and gravel purchases of $1,049,979 are
included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this
company in the amount of $30,056 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related
to sand and gravel purchases.
6.

Employee Benefit Plans

The Company has a contributory profit sharing and retirement plan for the
benefit of all employees who have completed one year of service (1,000
hours) and attained the age of 25. The plan provides for normal
retirement on the anniversary of the plan nearest the 65th birthday and
participants become fully vested after 10 years of services. The Company
may make contributions to the plan out of its net or cumulative earnings.
At February 28, 1987 the Company accrued no contributions to the plan.
7.

Commitment
The Company entered into an agreement on June 12, 1986 with its Parent
Company to pay $1,000,000 due in annual installments of $100,000 together
with accrued interest on February 25 until paid. The interest rate is
based on the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect
in the month of January in the year preceding the year each payment is
due.
Cash payments on the commitment will be made in the form of
dividends.
The Parent Company has a secured interest in all personal property,
accounts receivable and equipment of the Company.

HARPER EXCAVATING, INC.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

HARPER EXCAVATING, INC.
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
For the Period From May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987

Advertising
Bank charges
Insurance - general
Insurance - health
Management fees
Office supplies
Property taxes
Taxes, licenses and permits
Miscellaneous
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

$

257
2,815
131,430
10,576
318,250
1,061
10,946
43,344
15,823

$534,502

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 19
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REPORT OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Board of Directors and Stockholders
Harper Contracting, Inc.
We have examined the statement of financial position of Harper
Contracting, Inc.,. as of February 28, 1987 and the related statements of (loss)
and retained earnings (deficit), and changes in financial position for the
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987. Our
examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
and, accordingly, included such tests of the accounting records and such other
auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly
the financial position of Harper Contracting, Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and
the results of its operations and changes in its financial position for the
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987, in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.
Our examination was made primarily for the purpose of forming an opinion
on the basic financial statements taken as a whole. The accompanying
supplementary financial information in the accompanying schedules 1 & 2 is not.
considered necessary for a fair presentation of the basic financial statements
and is presented for analytical purposes only. The supplementary information
was derived from the accounting records tested by us as part of our examination
of the aforementioned financial statements and, in our opinion, is fairly
stated in all material respects in relation to the basic financial statements
taken as a whole.

May 8, 1987

HARPER CONTRACTING, INC,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION
February 28, 1987

ASSETS
Current Assets:
Cash
Accounts receivable (net of allowance
for doubtful accounts of $100,000)
Costs and estimated earnings in excess
of billings on uncompleted contracts
Receivables from related entities
Total current assets

Building and Equipment:
Building
Construction equipment

Less:

Accumulated depreciation

Net building and equipment

Total Assets

Continued on next page -

$

38,683
999,737
130,616
125,818
1,314,854

10,062
3,049,702
3,059,764
2,147,757
912,007

$2,226,861

(continued)

STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION

LIABILITIES AMD STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses
$
Billings in excess of costs and
estimated earnings on uncompleted
contracts
Payables to related entities
Deferred income taxes - current
Current portion of long-term debt
Total current l i a b i l i t i e s

Note payable-related entity
Long-term debt, excluding current portion
Deferred income taxes
Commitment
Total l i a b i l i t i e s
Stockholders' Equity:
Common stock; no par, stated value $100
authorized 50,000 shares, issued and '
outstanding 1,000 shares
Additional paid-in capital
Retained earnings (deficit)

118,419
16,370

138,311
342,678
220,300
347.036
1,183.114

J2?'2??
264,514
68,200
~
2,223,828

100,000
2,221
(99.188)

Total stockholders' equitv
3.033
Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity

The accompanying notes are an integral
part of the financial statements.

$2>226 g61

HARPER CONTRACTING, INC.
STATEMENTS OF (LOSS) AND RETAINED EARNINGS (DEFICIT)
For the Period From May 10. 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987

INCOME:
Contracting income
Direct costs

$8,466,577
7,438,087

Gross profit

1,028,490

EXPENSES:
General and administrative
Interest

1,060,545
67,131
1,127,676

Net operating (loss)

(99,186)

OTHER INCOME:
Interest income

7,298

(Loss) before provision for income taxes

(91,888)

Income tax (expense)

(7,300)

Net (Loss)

$

Retained earnings, beginning of period
Add:

$

Net (loss)

(99,188)

-0(99,188)

Retained earnings (deficit), end of period

The accompanying notes are an integral
part of the financial statements.

$

(99,188)

HARPER CONTRACTING, INC.
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION
For the Period From May'10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987

Funds Provided:
From operations:
Net (loss)
Items which do not use (provide)
working capital:
Depreciation
Deferred income taxes
Working capital provided by operations

$

(99,188)

303,700
36,500
241,012

From other sources:
Note payable-related entity
Long-term debt borrowings
Issuance of common stock
Total funds provided

708,000
203,977
102,221
1,255,210

Funds Applied:
Acquisition of building and equipment
Current maturities and repayment of
long-term debt
Long-term assets less long-term liabilities
spun off from Harper Excavating, Inc.
Total funds applied
Increase in Working Capital

Changes in Components of Working Capital:
Increase (decrease) in current assets:
Cash
Accounts receivable
Costs and estimated earnings in excess of
billings on uncompleted contracts
Receivables from related entities

(Increase) decrease in current liabilities:
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses
Billings in excess of costs and estimated
earnings on uncompleted contracts
Payables to related entities
Deferred income taxes - current
Current portion of long-term debt

Increase in Working Capital

153,754
297,743
671,973
1,123,470
$

131,740

$

38,683
999,737

150,616
125,818
1,314,854

118,419
16,370
138,311
342,678
220,300
347,036
1,183,114
$

131,740

HARPER CONTRACTING, INC,
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

1.

Summary of Significant 'Accounting Policies
a.

Business Information
On May 10, 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. performed a tax free
reorganization pursuant to section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code.
As part of this reorganization, three new corporations were formed.
At the close of business on May 9, 1986 Harper Excavating, Inc.
transferred at book value all fixed assets and liabilities relating
to the construction operations to Harper Contracting, Inc., in
exchange for 1,000 shares of Harper Contracting, Inc. no par common
stock.
Harper Excavating, Inc. then changed its corporate name to
Harper Investments, Inc. and Harper Investments, Inc. changed its
corporate name to Harper Excavating, Inc. The Company was organized
to carry on excavation operations.

b.

Building, Equipment and Depreciation
Building and equipment are stated at cost. Depreciation is provided
on the straight-line method on the estimated useful service lives of
the various classes of assets. The building is depreciated over 15
years and equipment over a 3 to 8 year period. Major replacements
which extend the useful lives of equipment are capitalized and
depreciated over the remaining useful life. Normal maintenance and
repair items are charged to costs and expenses as incurred.
The Company uses accelerated methods of depreciation for income tax
purposes. These methods provide more depreciation expense in the
early years than in the later years of the life of the asset.
Upon the retirement or disposal of equipment, the costs and related
accumulated depreciation amounts are eliminated and any gain or loss
is included in operations in the year of disposition.

c.

Accounting for Construction Contracts

The Company records revenues on construction contracts on the
percentage-of-completion method. Contract revenues are accrued based
upon the ratio of incurred costs to date to total estimated contract
c o s t s . Changes to total estimated contract costs and losses, i f any,
are recognized in the period they are determined.
Revenues
recognized in excess of amounts billed are classified as current
a s s e t s . Amounts billed in excess of revenues recognized to date are
c l a s s i f i e d as current l i a b i l i t i e s .
It i s anticipated that subs t a n t i a l l y a l l contract work in progress at February 28, 1987 will be
billed and collected in the next fiscal year.

Harper Contracting, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued
The Company repdrts revenues on construction contracts on the
percentage-of-completion capitalized-cost method for income tax
purposes. Under this method, 40 percent of the items with respect to
long term contracts are taken into account under the percentage-ofcompletion method and 60 percent of the items are taken into account
under the completed-contract method.
2.

Receivables/Payables with Related Entities
Receivables from the Parent Company at February 28, 1987, represents
receivables for cash deposits made into the Parent Company cash accounts.
Payables to the Parent Company represents amounts due for management fees
charged and other miscellaneous expenses paid for by the Parent Company.
Payables to other wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Parent Company
represents rental charged for the use of trucks, fuel, repairs and
maintenance, sand and gravel purchases and the hauling of material.
Following is a schedule of the receivables/payables with related entities:
Receivables
Parent Company
Other wholly-owned subsidiaries
of the Parent Company

Payables

$125,818

$

86,795

—
$125,818

255,883
$ 342,678

The amounts receivable/payable are non interest bearing and are expected
to be collected/paid in 1987.
3.

Income Taxes
Provision for income taxes is made based on earnings reported in the
financial statements for the amount of income taxes payable currently and
in the future (deferred income taxes). Deferred taxes arise from
computing depreciation using accelerated methods and the percentage-ofcompletion capitalized-cost method of recognizing revenue on construction
contracts for tax purposes. Deferred taxes attributable to the
percentage-of-completion capitalized-cost method of accounting are
recorded as a current liability and amounts attributable to accelerated
depreciation are shown as long-term.

Harper Contracting, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued
The (provision) benefit for income taxes consists of the following:
Current income taxes:
Federal provision
State provision
Current income tax (expense)
Deferred tax (expense)
(Provision) benefit for
income taxes

$

—
—
—
(7,300)

$ (7,300)

The current year loss of the Company will be made available as an offset
against other taxable income by filing a consolidated tax return with its
Parent Company and other wholly-owned subsidiaries for the current year.
4.

Note Payable - Related Entity
The Company entered into a promissory note agreement on June 12, 1986 with
its Parent Company for funds advanced it at the inception of the Company.
The note is a continuously adjustable revolving loan with the maximum
amount of borrowings not to exceed $708,000. The interest rate is based
on the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect in the
month of January in the year preceding the year each payment is due.
The unpaid principal balance at February 28, 1987 is $708,000 and is due
June, 1996. The note is secured by the Company's accounts receivable.

5.

Long-Term Debt
Long-term debt obligations at February 28, 1987 consist of the following:
10% - 13.8% notes payable, due in
monthly installments of $15,377
including interest due at various
times through November 1990,
secured by equipment.

$178,588

Prime + 1% note, due in monthly
installments of $2,646 including
interest due May 1988, secured
by equipment•

34,351

Prime + 1% note, due in monthly
installments of $10,168 including
interest due July 1989, secured
by equipment.

245,629

Harper Contracting, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued

12.75% note, due iii monthly
installments of $6,853 including
interest due March 1988, secured
by equipment.

76,842

Prime + .9% note, due in monthly
installments of $2,820 plus
interest due July 1989, secured
by equipment.

76,140

Total long-term debt
Less current portion of long-term debt
Total long-term debt excluding
current portion

611,550
347,036
$ 264,514

Aggregate maturities of long-term debt in each of the next five years are
as follows: 1988 - $347,035, 1989 - $166,682, 1990 - $ 77,652, 1991 $20,181, 1992 - $ —
.
Equipment pledged as collateral for the
above existing debt obligations:
Construction equipment

$ 1,548,635

Less: Accumulated depreciation
Book value of pledged equipment

726,458
$

822,177

Of the above book value of pledged equipment, $88,183 is also pledged as
collateral for debt obligations of related companies.
6.

Related Party Transactions
The Company has entered into an agreement with a wholly-owned subsidiary
of its Parent Company to purchase sand and gravel and provide the hauling
of materials to job sites. Sand and gravel purchases and material hauling
expenses, pursuant to this agreement, of $3,430,932 are included in the
financial statements as part of direct costs for the period ended February
28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this company in the amount of
$143,474 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to sand and gravel
purchases and the hauling of material.
The Company has its equipment maintained and repaired by a wholly-owned
subsidiary of its Parent Company. Maintenance and repairs of $770,629 are
included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the
period ended February 28, 1987.
The Company shows a payable to this
company in the amount of $93,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related
to repairs and maintenance.

Harper Contracting, Inc.
Notes to Financial Statements - continued

The Company also uses' trucks owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of its
Parent Company. Rental expense for these trucks amounted to $9,777 and
are included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this
company in the amount of $9,777 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related
to the truck rentals.
The Company has also entered into an agreement with its Parent Company,
whereby it pays a monthly management fee for record keeping and management
services provided by the Parent Company. Management fees, pursuant to
this agreement, of $747,000 are included in the financial statements for
the period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to its
Parent Company in the amount of $75,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2)
related to management fees.
7.

Employee Benefit Plans
The Company has a contributory profit sharing and retirement plan for the
benefit of all employees who have completed one year of service (1,000
hours) and attained the age of 25.
The plan provides for normal
retirement on the anniversary of the plan nearest the 65th birthday and
participants become fully vested after 10 years of services. The Company
may make contributions to the plan out of its net or cumulative earnings.
At February 28, 1987 the Company accrued no contributions to the plan.

8,

Commitment
The Company entered into an agreement on June 12, 1986 with its Parent
Company to pay $800,000 due in annual installment of $80,000 together with
accrued interest on February 25 until paid. The interest rate is based on
the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect in the
month of January in the year preceding the year each payment is due. Cash
payments on the commitment will be made in the form of dividends.
The Parent Company has a secured interest in all personal property,
accounts receivable and equipment of the Company.

HARPER CONTRACTING. INC.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Schedule 1
HARPER CONTRACTING, INC.
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES,
For the Period From May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987

Advertising
Bad debts
Bank charges
Insurance-general
Insurance-health
Management fees
Office supplies
Taxes, licenses and permits
Telephone and u t i l i t i e s
Miscellaneous
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

$

40
108,589
154
164,743
22,417
747,000
1,609
6,393
38
9,562

$1,060,545
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HALES SAND & GRAVEL, INC. v. AUDITING DIVISION
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH
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the carrier's charges. If Hales delivered the
material itself, its transportation charges were
commensurate with those a common carrier
would have charged.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
Before March 1, 1987, Hales collected and
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
remitted sales tax on the total charge for
materials and transportation. After March 1,
1987, Hales recorded and invoiced material and
HALES SAND & GRAVEL, INC.,
transportation charges separately, collecting and
Petitioner,
remitting tax only on charges for materials, not
AUDIT DIVISION OF THE STATE TAX on transportation charges. Hales employed this
bifurcated method of record keeping and
COMMISSION OF UTAH,
invoicing for all its sales, including sales to JTN
Respondent.
Construction, Inc., a Utah corporation that three
of Hales' four shareholders established to
No. 910008
perform federal contracts.1 Nor did Hales collect
FILED: November 12, 1992
or remit sales tax for the "small-batch charges"
it added to concrete batches that were too small
Original Proceeding in this Court
to absorb the costs of delivery.
After an audit of Hales' records for the period
ATTORNEYS:
of January of 1985 to December of 1987, the
David Nuffer, Lyle R. Drake, E. Scott
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Awerkamp, St. George, for Hales Sand and
Commission determined that under section
Gravel
59-12-103(l)(a) and (b) of the Code, Hales
R. Paul Van Dam, Brian L. Tarbet, Salt Lake
should have collected and remitted sales taxes on
City, for State Tax Commission
its transportation charges after March 1, 1987,
including the charges for small batches and for
delivery to JTN. See Utah Code Ann.
This opinion is subject to revision before
§59-12-103(l)(a), (b). The total deficiency
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
assessed was $128,792.49, which included a
negligence penalty of $9,712.82. See id.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
§§59-M01(3)(a), -12-110(5).
This is a proceeding to review a sales tax
Hales contested the assessment, claiming that
deficiency assessment by the Utah State Tax its transportation charges were exempt from
Commission. Hales Sand and Gravel, Inc., sales tax. The Commission rejected Hales'
petitions for review of the Commission's order claim, reasoning as follows: First, the
requiring Hales to pay sales tax on Commission decided that Hales did not qualify
transportation costs incurred in the delivery of for a tax exemption under section 59-12-104,
building materials to its customers. We affirm which exempts "intrastate movements of freight
the Commission's deficiency assessment but and express or street railway fares" from Utah's
reverse the negligence penalty it assessed Hales sales and use taxes. See id. §59-12-104(18)
for nonpayment.
(1987) (amended 1991) (current version at
Because a party seeking review of an order of §59-12-104(17)). The Commission interpreted
an administrative agency must demonstrate that the provision as applying only to common
the agency's factual determinations are not carriers. Second, the Commission decided that
supported by substantial evidence, we state the under its rule 865-19-7IS, Hales did not pass
facts and all legitimate inferences drawn title to its gravel, sand, concrete, and asphalt
therefrom in the light most favorable to the until it delivered the materials to its customers.
agency's findings. Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, This rule provides in relevant part that unless
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 15-16 (Oct. 27, 1992); otherwise agreed, title passes on delivery when
First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of a sales contract requires delivery at a particular
Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d place. See Utah Admin. R. 865-19-71S. The
1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). We state the facts in Commission concluded that since Hales
this case accordingly.
completed its performance only upon delivery,
Hales is a Utah corporation with its principal its transportation costs should be considered part
office in Redmond, Utah. Its primary business of the price of the sale and the entire transaction
involves retail sales of sand, gravel, asphalt, and should be subject to sales tax. See Utah Code
concrete. Purchasers may pick these materials Ann. §59-12-103(l)(a), (b). Because Hales had
up themselves; however, during the period at collected sales tax only on the purchase price of
issue, approximately 95 percent of Hales' gravel its materials, the Commission assessed Hales
purchasers and 70 percent of its asphalt sales tax for the transportation costs.
purchasers had Hales deliver their orders. When
The Commission also considered two related
a customer elected to have the materials matters. First, Hales claimed that it should not
delivered, Hales either delivered the materials in have had to collect or remit sales tax for the
its own trucks or arranged for transportation by small-batch charges it added to concrete
a common carrier and billed the customer for
200 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
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orders that were too small to absorb delivery amounts paid to "common earners" for "all"
Utah
Code
Ann.
costs. The Commission disagreed, finding that t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
While the
section
the small-batch charges were essentially nothing § 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 3 ( l ) ( b ) .
exemption for intrastate
more than transportation charges, which 59-12-104(18)
therefore were subject to sales tax. Second, transportation of freight does not mention
Hales argued that the Commission should credit common carriers, it is a logical inference that
it for taxes it had paid on sales to JTN that were the legislature imposed the general tax on
made before March 1, 1987, because the Utah common carriers in section 59-12-103(l)(b) and
Department of Transportation bad determined then sought to limit its application to cotmnon
that Hales and JTN were the same entity for the carriers in section 59-12-104(18).
purposes of federal labor law. Again the
Other provisions in the statutes have a similar
Commission disagreed, finding that Hales and structure of a general imposition of tax followed
JTN were separate legal entities and that their by specific limitations. For example, although
transactions were subject to sales tax. In sum, I section 59-12-103 taxes "meals sold," id.
the Commission assessed Hales $41,739.95 for §59-12-103(l)(e), section 59-12-104 exempts
total sales tax due and $9,712 as a negligence airline food and certain vending machine food
penalty.2
sales from the "meals sold" tax, id.
Before our court, Hales challenges all aspects §59-12-104(3), (4). This pattern supports the
of the Commission's order. See
id. inference that the legislature intended section
§78-2-2(3)(e)(ii). Before examining Hales' 59-12-104(18) to do nothing more than limit the
claims, we note the applicable standards of II tax specifically imposed on common carriers.
review. This review presents questions of both
Although we generally construe taxing statutes
law and fact. As provided by the Utah in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), we authority, we construe statutes providing tax
grant deference to an agency *s factual findings exemptions strictly against the taxpayer. Parson
and will overturn those findings only if the Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n>
petitioner marshals the facts and shows that in I 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). We therefore
light of the record as a whole, the agency's construe section 59-12-104(18) agamst Hales.
findings are not supported by substantial Because the construction that limits the
evidence. See id. §63-46b-16(4)(g); First Nat'l exemption to common carriers finds logical
Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165. On the other support in the structure of the statute, we reject
hand, we grant no such deference to the Hales' broader gloss. We hold that section
agency's interpretation or application of law, II 59-12-104(18)'s sales tax exemption is limited to
which we review for correctness.3 Utah Code II common
carriers.
Utah
Code
Ann.
Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. J §59-12-104(18). Because Hales is not a common
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991); carrier, it is not entitled to the benefits of the
Savage Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 exemption.
P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991). With these
We next turn to Hales' contention that even
standards in mind, we turn to the merits of this II without the exemption, its transportation charges
case.
IJ were not subject to sales tax. The provision at
We begin with Hales' first contention-thatthe IJ issue is section 59-12-103(l)(a), which reads as
Commission erred when it limited the section follows:
59-12-104(18) tax exemption to common II (1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser
carriers. That section reads as follows:
II for the amount paid or charged for the
The following sales and uses are exempt
following:
from the taxes imposed by this chapter:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal
. . . ,
I
property made within the state[.]
(18) intrastate movements of freight and
Id. §59-12-103(1 )(a). Hales claims that its
express or street railway fares[.]
asphalt, sand, concrete, and gravel sales were
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(18). Hales argues completed at its pit or plant and that therefon
that the provision's plain language exempting any transportation charges accrued after the sale
intrastate "movements of freight" is not limited were complete. In other words, it argues tha
to common carriers but should extend to all title to the merchandise passed at the point o
transportation costs. We disagree.
sale instead of at delivery and that it had n
In construing a statute, we view it as a II obligation to collect and remit sales tax on tfa
comprehensive whole, not as an unrelated transportation charges.
collection of provisions. See Silver v. Auditing
Hales' argument breaks into two subsidiai
D/v., 820 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1991); Amax issues. First, what is the proper legal standai
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, for determining passage of title? Secon
796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990); Peay v. applying that standard, is the Commission
Board of Ed. ofProvo Gty Schools, 14 Utah 2d finding that Hales did not pass title until delive
63, 66, 377 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1962). J correct? We take each question in turn.
Applying this principle to the statute before us,
We begin with the common ground. Be
we look first to section 59-12-103, which Hales and the Commission agree that passage
#t„> cai*<j tax from which Hales seeks J title is the moment upon which the transaction
*~ U a VJOII^H for the purposes of the tax. T
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transportation charges are taxable if the)' are
Notwithstanding this holding, it is important to
incurred before the transfer of title because this note that for some of its transactions, the
increases the total selling price; transportation taxpayer in Whitehill had adduced evidence of an
charges are not taxable if they are incurred after explicit agreement to pass title at the point of
the passage of title because they are not part of shipment. Consequently, the Whitehill court may
the taxed sales transaction. While the text pf the not have meant that in the absence of any
sales tax statute does not mention such a test, evidence as to the parties' intent, it would infer
see id. §59-12-103, this court has interpreted the that title passed on shipment. Instead, its refusal
predecessor statute as hinging taxability on the to infer that title had passed on delivery may
passage of title.4 See Whitehill Sand & Gravel stem solely from the fact that Whitehill had
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 106 Utah 469, 472, produced some evidence rebutting that
150 P.2d 370, 371 (1944); see also Ford J. presumption. We reject Hales' contention that
Tmits Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 106 Whitehill prohibits an inference that title passes
Utah 343, 348, 148 P.2d 343, 345 (1944). In at shipment.
fact, the Commission has promulgated a rule
Second, even if Whitehill established a
adopting the passage-of-title test for fixing the rebuttable presumption that title passes on
moment for determining the tax. See Utah shipment, which we do not think it did, Utah's
Admin. R. 865-19-71S.
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
While Hales and the Commission agree that "UCC") overruled WhitehiWs holding by
passage of title determines the taxability of the creating a new test for determining passage of
transportation charges, they differ as to who has title. Section 70A-2-401 (2) provides:
the burden of proving the point of passage. Each
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title
contends that Whitehill requires the other to
passes to the buyer at the time and place at
prove when title passed. The Commission argues
which the seller completes his performance
that title passes to the buyer on delivery unless
with reference to the physical delivery of the
the seller produces evidence to the contrary.
goods, despite any reservation of a security
Hales insists that Whitehill requires the
interest and even though a document of title
Commission to prove that title passed on
is to be delivered at a different time or
delivery by producing evidence in support of its
place; and in particular and despite any
conclusion. Because the Commission did not
reservation of a security interest by the bill
produce such evidence here, Hales argues, this
of lading
court should presume that title passed at the
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes
point of shipment. We disagree with Hales for
the seller to send the goods to the buyer but
two reasons. First, we are unconvinced that
does not require him to deliver them at
Whitehill stands for the proposition Hales
destination, title passes to the buyer at the
asserts. Second, even if Whitehill did establish a
time and place of shipment; but
rebuttable presumption that title passes at
(b) if the contract requires delivery at
shipment, Utah's adoption of the Uniform
destination, title passes on tender there.
Commercial Code overruled its holding and Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-401(2). This section
established a new test for passage of title under establishes a new test in cases where the parties
which it is clear that Hales passed title to its have not "explicitly agreed" when title shall
merchandise at delivery, not before. We discuss pass. This test hinges the passage of title on
these points in turn.
whether the contract requires delivery at
We first address Hales' interpretation of destination. Cf. O'Kelley-Eccles Co. v. State,
Whitehill. In Whitehill, the plaintiff showed that 324 P.2d 683, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
in some of the transactions included in a Because a purchase agreement will always either
deficiency tax assessment, the parties had specify or not specify delivery at destination, the
contracted explicitly to pass title at point of Whitehill presumption is irrelevant. In adopting
shipment, before the materials were transported the UCC, the legislature declared that when a
to the customer. 106 Utah at 474-75, 150 P.2d contract requires delivery at destination, title
at 372. The court concluded that while the passes at destination unless the parties explicitly
Commission correctly assessed sales tax agree otherwise. See Utah Code Ann.
deficiencies for two transactions where the §70A-2-401(2). This is the test applicable to this
parties had agreed that title would pass at case. This is also the test, codified in the
delivery, id. at 475, 150 P.2d at 372, in the Commission's rules, that the Commission
majority of the transactions, the facts were not applied in determining that Hales did not pass
so clear cut, id. at 475,150 P.2d at 372-73. The title to its merchandise until delivery. See Utah
court set aside the assessment and remanded for Admin. R. 865-19-71S(B)(l), (3).
a rehearing on the question of when title passed
Having determined that the Commission
in those ambiguous transactions. In so doing, it applied the correct legal test to Hales' case, we
held that the Commission could not infer that next review its finding that Hales did not pass
title had passed on delivery from the mere fact title until delivery. As an initial matter, we note
that invoices listed the pit price plus delivery that Hales anticipated our analysis under section
charge as a single item, with the sales tax 70A-2-401(2) and has argued that its sales
applied only to the pit price for the sand or contracts did not "require" delivery at
gravel. Id. at 475 K O P ^ «• ITI

Hales Sand & travel v

200 Utah/kdv Rep. 3

because its customers could elect to collect their
orders at the pit or plant. Therefore, it contends,
title to its merchandise passed at shipment under
section 70A-2-401(2). We disagree. Once a
customer elected to have the material delivered
rather than picking it up, Hales and the customer
had a contract for delivery at destination. See
East Brewton Materials, Inc. v. State Dep't of
Revenue, 233 So. 2d 751, 757 (Ala. Civ. App.
1970); TOBI Transp., Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 163 Cal. Rptr. 778, 780 (Ct. App.
1980); Santa Clara Sand & Gravel Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 37 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508-09
(Ct. App. 1964); O'Kelley-Eccles Co., 324P.2d
at 686. Absent an explicit agreement to the
contrary, title to Hales' materials passed when
Hales fulfilled its contract and made delivery.
See Santa Clara Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 508-09, 511.
As an alternative challenge to the
Commission's findings, Hales argues that the
transactions in question satisfy the first line of
section 70A-2-401(2)~wunless
otherwise
explicitly provided"-because the purchase
orders show an agreement between Hales and its
customers to pass title at the point of shipment.
As evidence, Hales submitted several purchase
orders and invoices showing separate entries for
costs of materials and transportation. These
separate entries do not prove a bilateral
agreement to pass title at shipment instead of
delivery, as required by section 70A-2-401(2).
Under the UAPA, Hales has the burden of
demonstrating that no substantial evidence
supports the Commission's finding that no
explicit bilateral agreement existed on the
subject of title transfer. See Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-16(4)(g); First Nat'I Bank of Boston,
799 P.2d at 1165. The invoices and purchase
orders it submitted may be firm evidence of
Hales' own intent to pass title at pomt of
shipment; however, without more, they do not
prove an explicit agreement by the customers to
take title at the point of shipment. Because
unilateral subjective intent does not prove
explicit agreement between the parties to pass
title at point of shipment, see Utah Code Ann.
§70A-2-401(2); O'Kelley-Eccles Co., 324 P.2d
at 686, Hales has failed to marshal the facts to
show that the Commission's finding is not
supported by substantial evidence. See First
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165.
Consequently, we affirm the Commission's
finding that Hales did not pass title until
delivery. Because it did not pass title until
delivery, Hales was obligated to collect and
remit sales tax on its transportation charges.
In its brief, Hales points to several foreign
cases, arguing that other jurisdictions have held
that title passes at or before shipment. Hales is
correct as to the holdings of these cases;
however, they have been rendered in
circumstances far different from those in the
present case. The court in Revenue Cabinet v.
rnrum A Edwards. Inc., 673 S.W.2d 736 (Ky.

Provo, Utah 1

that title passed before delivery on the umque
nature of ready-mix concrete, which spoils if the
customer rejects delivery. Because of ready-mix
concrete's short lifespan, industry custom and
practice recognize that title passes when the
ingredients are mixed. Id. at 739. The court
explicitly noted that it was basing its
determination on the custom of the industry, not
on Kentucky's version of section 70A-2-401(2),
id., thereby implying that but for the custom of
the particular industry, title would have passed
at deliveiy under Kentucky's counterpart to
section 70A-2-401(2). This implication bolsters
the Commission's position in this case because
in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute
did not impose a test for passage of title, and an
administrative rule did impose a test for passage
of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes nc
claim that the impermanence of its material!
results in a generally understood, implici
agreement to pass title at some point befon
delivery. Moreover, our statute requires ai
explicit agreement on passage of title before th<
statutory presumption can be rebutted; there i
no obvious provision in this statute for aj
implicit understanding, which the Kentuck
court thought sufficient. Consequently, the fact
of Revenue Cabinet are inapposite and its resu
is inapplicable to the case at bar.5 See also Kurt
Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 85f
862 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (holding that tit]
passes on mixture of ready-mix concrete becaui
of usage of trade).
We hold that the Commission applied tl
correct legal test in finding that Hales did n
pass title until delivery and therefore wi
required to collect and remit sales taxes on i
transportation costs.
We next consider Hales' contention that ev<
if the Commission's order was correct
general, Hales' small-batch charges and sales
JTN should not be subject to sales tax and tt
the Commission should credit Hales for a
taxes it paid on sales to JTN before March
1987. We take the small-batch and JTN issues
turn.
The small-batch question can be disposed
quickly. Hales admits that the small-ba!
charge is, in essence, a transportation chai
added to the price of batches of concrete that i
too small to absorb the cost of delivery. Un<
the passage of title analysis outlined abo
therefore, small-batch charges are taxable unl
the parties explicitly agree otherwise. Hales ]
produced no evidence of such agreement. 1
case it cites in support of exempting small-b*
charges from taxation is inapposite because
relies on an explicit statutory exemption of
freight charges. See Maryland Redi-Mix, Inc
Comptroller of the Treasury, Sales Tax No. 2
1985 WL 6114 (Md. Tax Aug. 2, 19!
Because Utah has no comparable statute or r
Maryland Redi-Mix is of no assistance. See S
v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 63, 252 P. 280,
(1926).

Similarly unconvincing is Hales' contention
that transfers of materials to JTN should not be
taxable. Hales paid taxes on sales to JTN before
March 1, 1987, but now seeks reimbursement of
those payments and a tax exemption for later
payments because, it says, the two corporations
are the same entity for tax purposes. Hales bases
its argument on the fact that the Utah
Department of Transportation, as instructed by
the United States Department of Labor, found
that JTN and Hales should be considered a
single construction subcontractor for the
purposes of setting the salaries of employees
performing federal contracts as required by the
Davis-Bacon Act. See 40 U.S.C. §§276a to
276a-5. Because the Utah Department of
Transportation considers Hales and JTN to be a
single entity for purposes of federal contracts,
Hales argues, this court should estop the State of
Utah from assessing sales tax against Hales for
sales to JTN.
This position lacks support from either state or
federal law. First, we have never held that one
agency's determination is binding on the
deliberations of another agency. In fact, under
the UAPA, an agency's determinations are not
even binding on that agency itself, so long as the
agency justifies its departure from prior practice
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency. See
Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16(h)(iii); see also
BJ-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 183 Utah
Adv. Rep. 20, 26 (Mar. 31, 1992). As the
Commission points out in its brief, "If an
administrative body is not bound by its own
prior determinations, that agency certainly
should not be constrained by the determinations
of a different agency."
Second, federal labor law criteria are simply
irrelevant to a determination of state taxability.6
As this court stated in 1964, "[T]he impact of
federal requirements on the operations of
plaintiff do not affect Utah's power to tax sales
of services and property where title and delivery
pass[] within the state." Ogden Union Ry. <£
Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm 7i, 16 Utah 2d 23,
28, 395 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah 1964).
Third, the Davis-Bacon Act protects
employees, not their employers. "As a basic
proposition, it is settled that contractors can
claim no legal rights growing solely out of
Davis-Bacon Act minimum wage determinations
by the Secretary of Labor, for such provisions
are not incorporated in the contract for their
benefit." Morrison-Hardeman-Perine-Leavell v.
United States, 392 F.2d 988, 995 (Ct. CI.
1968). Because Hales' position seems to lack
any legal basis, we affirm both the
Commission's refusal to reimburse Hales for tax
paid on transactions with JTN before March 1,
1987, and the Commission's deficiency
assessment against Hales for JTN transactions
after March 1, 1987.
The final issue is whether Hales should be
liable for a 10-percent negligence penalty for
failing to collect and remit taxes on its sales

since March 1, 1987. See Utah Code Ann.
§§59-1-401 (3)(a), -12-110(5). A 10-percent
negligence penalty is appropriate when the
taxpayer has failed to pay taxes and a reasonable
investigation into the applicable rules and
statutes would have revealed that the taxes were
due. A 15-percent penalty for intentional
disregard of the law is imposed when the
taxpayer has failed to pay taxes, a reasonable
investigation into the applicable rules and
statutes would have revealed that the taxes were
due, and the Commission has informed the
taxpayer that the taxes were due. See id.
§59-1-401 (3)(b); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 18,
21-22 (Sept. 30, 1992). In both instances, the
taxpayer can escape the penalty if he or she can
show that he or she based the nonpayment of
taxes on a legitimate, good faith interpretation of
an arguable point of law. Cf. Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co., 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21-22.
Applying this standard to the facts before us,
we find that Hales should not be subject to the
negligence penalty because it based its
nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good faith
interpretation of an arguable point of law. Hales
advanced two primary reasons for its
nonpayment of taxes. First, it argued that its
transportation charges were exempt from sales
tax; second, it argued that title to its
merchandise passed at the point of shipment and
that therefore transportation costs were not part
of the price of the sale. Although we find that
Hales' reliance on the second ground was
neither reasonable nor legitimate,7 we do
recognize that the statute listing the sales tax
exemptions presented a potential ambiguity as to
the scope of the exemption for intrastate
movements of freight, which may have misled
Hales. See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(18)
(1987) (amended 1991) (current version at
§59-12-104(17)). The Commission recognized as
much in its hearing memorandum. Because of
the existence of this ambiguity, we reverse the
$9,712 negligence penalty assessed against
Hales.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice

1. The record suggests that the shareholders formed
JTN to avoid paying Hales' employees the higher,
federally mandated wages required of companies
performing federal contracts. See The Davis-Bacon
Act, 40 U.S.C. §§276ato 276a-5.
2. The parties stipulated to these amounts before the
Commission. The record is unclear as to why these
amounts differ from those initially assessed against
Hales by the Auditing Division.
3 . We recently have indicated that we will grant
intermediate deference to an agency's interpretation or
application of specific laws when the legislature has
e x n l i e i f l v r>r imnlir»itKf AaA*~~*~** -»*
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agency to interpret or apply that law. See Morton
lnt% Inc v Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah
1991). Because here there is no explicit delegation of
discretion and because the questions at issue are of
general law and specific statutory construction on
which the Commission's experience and expertise will
be of no real assistance, see Sandy City v. Salt Lake
County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992), Chris <*
Dick's Lumber v. Tax Comm'n,19\ P.2d 511, 513-14
(Utah 1990), we do not apply the standard of
intermediate deference to the legal issues in this case.
SeeZissi, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 n.2, Morton, 814
P.2d at 588-89.
4. The predecessor to the taxation statute differs
slightly from that at issue here, but both Hales and the
Commission agree that the differences are
insignificant.
5. The other cases Hales cites are equally
unconvincing. The court in Clarion Ready Mixed
Concrete Co. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 107
N W.2d 553 (Iowa 1961), exempted transportation
costs from sales tax in a situation totally unlike that
before us There, the statutory exemption for
transportation costs was not limited to common
carriers, the state did not recognize passage of title as
the pivotal fact for determining taxability, the
merchandise was perishable ready-mix concrete
instead of the comparatively permanent materials at
issue in the instant case, and the court found that both
the buyer and the seller intended that the contracts for
sale and transportation be independent. Id. at 556-58.
Because of these distinctions, Clarion offers little
guidance in resolving this case Similarly, the court in
In re Sales dc Use Tax Determination, 225 N.W 2d
571 (N.D. 1974), held only that incidental but
separate bargaining for transportation costs implies an
agreement to pass title at the point of shipment. Id. at
574, 576, 578. Because Hales has adduced no
evidence of separate bargaining for transportation
costs, In re Sales does not aid its argument.
6. Although we make no ruling on this issue, federal
labor law criteria probably are also irrelevant to a
determination offederal taxability. In concluding that
JTN and Hales should be treated as one entity because
of their shared equipment, facilities, records,
management, and employees, the Department of
Labor took pains to emphasize that the factors relevant
to its determination were completely independent of
those "that may be of paramount importance to other
governmental agencies, such as the Internal Revenue
Service . . . ." Letter from Arthur M. Kerschner, Jr.,
Employment Standards Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
to E. Jane Casper, Conduction Div., Utah Dep't of
Transp. (Aug 3, 1989) (emphasis added).
7. The law extant in March of 1987, the month Hales
stopped collecting and remitting sales taxes, made
clear that taxation of transportation charges depended
on passage of title, see Whitehill, 106 Utah at 472,
150 P.2d at 371, and that absent an explicit agreement
to the contrary, title passed on delivery, see Utah
Code Ann. §70A-2-401(2). Moreover, the first edition
of the Utah Administrative Code, which went into
effect July 1, 1987—only five months after Hales
stopped collecting and remitting taxes—not only
presented the Commission's rules for passage of title,
but also provided examples of how those rules would
beapplied. See Utah Admin. R. 865-72S-1 (1987-88).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Richard H. NIELSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mark O'REILLY, Linda R. French, and
Metropolitan Property & Liability
Insurance Co.,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 900489
FILED: November 13, 1992
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
ATTORNEYS:
L. Rich Humpherys, Karra J. Porter, Salt
Lake City, for Richard Nielsen
Glenn C. Hanni, Barbara L. Maw, Salt Lake
City, for Metropolitan Property
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Richard H. Nielsen appeals the
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
that $250,000 is the maximum recovery possible
under the uninsured motorist provision of an
insurance policy issued by defendant
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co.
("Metropolitan"). We affirm.
The facts of this case are undisputed. Prior to
April of 1983, Nielsen purchased an insurance
policy from Metropolitan. The policy insured
two automobiles owned by Nielsen and was in
force at all relevant times. Among other
coverages, the policy included uninsured
motorist protection with a limit of $250,000 for
"each person" and $500,000 for "each accident."
Metropolitan charged a separate premium foi
each vehicle.
On April 28, 1983, Nielsen and his son were
involved in an automobile accident with twe
uninsured motorists, Mark O'Reilly and Linda
French. As a result of the accident, both Nielsei
and his son sustained personal injuries and file<
claims with Metropolitan. Metropolitan settle*
the claim of Nielsen's son and made a partia
payment of $1,707 to Nielsen. However, n
settlement was reached on the remaining portio
of Nielsen's claim. Ultimately, Nielsen filed su
against Metropolitan, O'Reilly, and Frencl
seeking an apportionment of fault and
determination of Nielsen's damages an
Metropolitan's liability.
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ants' failure to comply with Rule 2.9(b) of
the Rules of Practice in the District Courts
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah.
Rule 2.9(b) states:
Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall be served on
opposing counsel before being presented
to the court for signature unless the
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to the
court within (5) days after service.
Compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is necessary
in order that a judgment be "filed" as we
have construed that term under Rule
58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Larsen v. Larsen, Utah, 674 P.2d
116, 117 (1983); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, Utah,
618 P.2d 50, 52 (1980). The record indicates that no copies of the proposed judgment and findings were sent to counsel for
plaintiffs, and there is nothing in the trial
transcript to show that the trial court
waived that requirement. Therefore, no
judgment has been "filed" within the meaning of the Rule, and this appeal is premature. Utah R. Civil P., Rules 58A(c) and
72(a).
The appeal is dismissed, and the case is
remanded to the trial court for a proper
filing of the judgment in compliance with
Rule 2.9(b), from which plaintiffs may take
a timely appeal if they so desire.

INSTITUTIONAL LAUNDRY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 19390.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 26, 1985.
Subsidiary corporation brought action
challenging sales tax assessment for laundry services provided by it to parent corporation. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., upheld
sales tax assessment, and subsidiary appealed. The Supreme Court held that sub-

sidiary, with separate corporate existence,
was liable for sales tax in regard to laundry services provided for parent corporation on nonprofit basis.
Affirmed.
1. Corporations <3=>1.5(3)
Corporation, be it parent or subsidiary,
has its own legal identity and existence,
and common ownership or control does not
automatically destroy that separate identity.
2. Corporations <s=»1.5(l)
Although in appropriate cases equity
may look through corporate shell to corporation's alter ego to prevent fraud or
wrongdoing, general rule is that separate
corporations are separate legal entities
bound by obligations as well as benefits.
3. Corporations e=>1.6(ll)
Corporate structure will not be disregarded just to facilitate tax avoidance;
corporation may not disregard or shed its
corporate clothing to avoid tax consequences.
4. Taxation <s=>1261
When taxpayer has chosen to conduct
business under particular arrangement, it
cannot disregard consequences of that arrangement when it would otherwise be to
taxpayer's disadvantage.
5. Taxation <3=>1261
Subsidiary corporation was subject to
sales tax for laundry services provided to
parent corporation on nonprofit basis, notwithstanding that subsidiary owned no
property, kept no separate corporate
records, and had same board of directors as
parent; having elected to operate as corporation, for whatever benefits that status
offered, subsidiary was also required to
accept tax burdens of that status. U.C.A.
1953, 59-l£-4(g), 59-15-5.
6. Taxation <s=>1201
Liability for sales tax does not depend
upon existence of profit.
M. Stephen Coontz, Park City, for plaintiff and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Mark K.
Buchi, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
respondent.
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant Institutional Laundry, Inc.
(hereafter "Institutional") challenges a
sales tax assessment by the Tax Commission for laundry services provided by Institutional to its parent corporation.
The facts providing the basis for the
assessment are undisputed. During 1978
and 1979, Institutional was a Utah corporation owned 100% by Wasatch Medical
Management Services, Inc. (hereafter
"WMMS"), a health care provider. Institutional owned no property and kept no separate corporate records. Its board of directors was the same as the board of directors of WMMS. Institutional existed
only for the administrative convenience of
WMMS, providing laundry services for the
parent on a nonprofit basis. Subsequent to
1979, the formal corporate status of Institutional was terminated and it became a
division of WMMS. During 1978 and 1979,
medicare and medicaid programs reimbursed WMMS on a nonprofit basis for
laundry care services received from Institutional.
Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 59-15-4(g)
(as amended), the State Tax Commission
assessed sales tax for the laundry services
that were provided from July 1978 through
December 1979 by Institutional and
charged to WMMS. Institutional appealed
the assessment by filing a petition in the
district court. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Institutional^ motion was
denied and the motion of the Tax Commission granted. We affirm the summary
judgment.
A sales tax is specifically imposed under
U.C.A., 1953, § 59-15-4(g) (as amended) on
amounts charged by Institutional for laundry and dry cleaning services. The laundry services performed by Institutional are
clearly within the language of the statute.
Institutional has the responsibility for the
collection and remittance of the tax to the
State Tax Commission. U.C.A., 1953,
§ 59-15-5 (as amended). However, Institutional claims that its nonprofit transactions
with its parent corporation are not taxable.
Although none of the statutory exemptions

to our sales tax under U.C.A., 1953, § 5915-6 (as amended) are applicable, Institutional argues that as a wholly owned subsidiary of WMMS, it has no real separate
corporate existence and is therefore exempt from tax.
[1-3] A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, has its own legal identity and existence. Common ownership or control does
not automatically destroy that separate
identity. Although in appropriate cases equity may look through the corporate shell
to its alter-ego to prevent fraud or wrongdoing, the general rule still applies that
corporations are separate legal entities
bound by the obligations as well as the
benefits. Surgical Supply Center v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Dept of
Employment Security, 118 Utah 632, 223
P.2d 593, 595 (1950); Messick v. PHD
Trucking Service, Inc, Utah, 678 P.2d 791
(1984). The corporate structure will not be
disregarded just to facilitate tax avoidance.
Western States Bankcard Association v.
City & County of San Francisco, 19
Cal.3d 208, 137 Cal.Rptr. 183, 561 P.2d 273
(1977).
[4,5] Having elected to operate as a
corporation, for whatever benefits that separate status conferred upon Institutional
and its parent, Institutional must also accept the tax burden and responsibility attendant to its corporate form. A corporation may not disregard or shed its corporate clothing to avoid tax consequences.
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395
P.2d 57 (1964), modified on rehearing, 16
Utah 2d 255, 399 P.2d 145 (1965); Cal-Metal Corp. v. California State Board of
Equalization, 161 Cal.App.3d 759, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 783 (1984). When a taxpayer has
chosen to conduct business under a particular arrangement, it cannot disregard the
consequence of that arrangement when it
would otherwise be to the taxpayer's disadvantage. 19 Cal.3d at 219, 137 Cal.Rptr.
183, 561 P.2d 273; Mercedes-Benz of North
America, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 127 Cal.App.3d 871, 179 Cal.Rptr. 758
(1982); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State,
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Colo., 628 P.2d 85 (1981); Simplicity Pattern Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
27 Cal.3d 900, 167 Cal.Rptr. 366, 615 P.2d
555 (1980).
The claim that nonprofit transactions between parent and subsidiary corporations
are nontaxable events was settled by this
Court in Ogden Union Railway and Depot
Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra. In
Ogden Union Railway, the plaintiff provided railway depot services and supplies
on a nonprofit basis to its parent companies
Union Pacific Railroad and Southern Pacific Company. We held that transactions
between parent and subsidiary are within
the purview of the sales tax notwithstanding that the business of the subsidiary is
nonprofit and exclusively with and for the
convenience of the parent We also rejected as unpersuasive the case of Valier Coal
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 11 I11.2d
402, 143 N.E.2d 35 (1957), upon which Institutional relies here. 16 Utah 2d at 27-28,
395 P.2d 57. See also Superior Coal Co.
v. Department of Finance, 377 111. 282, 36
N.E.2d 354, 358 (1941); annot, 64 A.L.R.2d
769 (1959).
In addition to Valier Coal Co., appellant
Institutional relies upon Mapo, Inc. v.
State Board of Equalization, 53 Cal.
App.3d 245, 125 Cal.Rptr. 727 (1975). Although in Mapo the transactions between
parent and subsidiary were exclusive and
nonprofit, that court found other factors
significant which are not present in the
instant case. The sole reason for Mapo's
existence was merely to simplify union employment agreements. All other aspects of
the company, including payroll and manufacturing, were entirely controlled by the
grandfather company, Walt Disney Produc-

tions. Also, Mapo had previously obtained
a favorable ruling from the taxing board
based upon California sales tax provisions
not found in our statute. 53 Cal.App.3d at
248-49, 125 Cal.Rptr. 727.
[6] Institutional also argues that its
charges for laundry services provided to
WMMS are nontaxable to the extent
WMMS was paid by medicare or medicaid
on a nonprofit basis. We also rejected a
similar contention in Ogden Union Railway. 16 Utah 2d at 28, 395 P.2d 57. Liability for sales tax does not depend upon
the existence of a profit. There was no
state medicaid or federal medicare regulation which required Institutional to limit its
services to WMMS or imposed any price
limitation on the amount Institutional could
charge for its service. The only restriction
by either medicare or medicaid was the
amount which that program was willing to
pay the health care provider. It was no1
required to accept medicare or medicaid
assistance. There is no showing by plaintiff that the state controlled or restricted
Institutional^ business or activities. Institutional was free to make whatever business arrangement it chose with WMMS or
any other customer.
We do not find any basis for departing
from our prior decision and affirm the summary judgment below in favor of the State
Tax Commission.

